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Advisory Opinions and Canadian
Constitutional Development: The
Supreme Court's Reference Jurisdiction
James L. Huffman,* MardiLyn SaathofE**
Unlike United States courts,' Canadian courts have the
power to render advisory opinions. 2 The Canadian experience

over the last century suggests that advisory opinions can prove
beneficial. Indeed, on fundamental questions of constitutional
organization and governmental power, the abstract character of
advisory proceedings offers advantages over the concrete setting of traditional adversary proceedings.3
Pursuant to its reference jurisdiction,4 the Supreme Court
of Canada issues advisory opinions on a wide range of legal
Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
Student, Lewis & Clark Law School.
1. The case or controversy provision of Article I of the United States
Constitution precludes federal courts from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions." Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S.
450, 461 (1945). Federal courts will not "give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative [or executive] action." Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 362 (1911). Since the Supreme Court refused in 1792 to advise Congress and the Secretary of War on certain pension applications, Hayburn's
Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409-10 (1792), and in 1793 to advise President Washington on questions relating to United States neutrality in the European War
*
**

of 1793, see H. JOHNSTON,

CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JoHN JAY,

486-89 (1891), federal courts have not rendered advisory opinions.
A few states allow their courts to render advisory opinions. See infra
note 9 (listing states). In those states, however, judges "often maintain the notion that, in so doing, they are performing an extrajudicial function, and that
such opinions should consequently have dramatically limited stare decisis effect." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW 73 n.4 (1988). See generally
Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 HARv. L.

REV. 1302 (1956).
2. See infra notes 26-56 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 136-72 and accompanying text.
4. The name derives from the procedure by which the Governor General
in Council refers questions to the Supreme Court. References also may reach
the Supreme Court on appeal from provincial high courts that have rendered
opinions on questions referred by the Lieutenant Governor in Council for the
province. See infra notes 25-56 and accompanying text (detailing statutory basis of the Supreme Court's reference jurisdiction).
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questions. Recent disagreements over proper procedures for
amending the Canadian Constitution5 illustrate that the
Supreme Court's advisory opinions often involve questions of
the greatest national concern, 6 and predominantly involve the
issue of federalism. 7 Canadians have accepted this role for
5. E.g., Reference re Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793; Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
6. See, e.g., Reference re Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 52 S.C.R. 793. At issue was the Province of Quebec's assertion
that the Canadian Parliament needed consent from all the provinces to adopt
an amendment to the Constitution of Canada that would affect the legislative
competence of the provinces and the status of the provinces in the Canadian
federation. Id. at 798. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of Quebec
and the new Canadian Constitution took effect on April 17, 1982. Id. at 806.
This opinion, along with an earlier reference opinion on essentially the same
issue, Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753,
was of central importance to the enactment of a fundamental change in the
constitutional definition of the Canadian federation. Reference cases have involved similarly important issues throughout Canada's national history. See B.
STRAYER, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE CoURTS 271 (1983) (stating

that more than 25% of leading decisions were made in reference proceedings).
For a complete listing of all reference opinions and their subject matter, see
Appendix.
7. Most federalism references involve interpretation of §§ 91-92 of the
British North America Act (BNA Act). The passage of the BNA Act of 1867
marks the creation of the Canadian federation, with enumerated powers
granted to both the federal and provincial governments. Sedler, Constitutional Protectionof Individual Rights in Canada: The Impact of the New Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1191, 1193
(1984). The original BNA Act is reprinted in G. BROWNE, THE JUDICIAL COMmrrrE AND THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT 173-208 (1967).
In the Canadian system, a clear line theoretically demarcates federal and
provincial jurisdictions and one should not invade the other. A challenge to a
statute as ultra vires requires a two-step analysis. A threshold inquiry addresses whether the legislation is expressly and exclusively within one section
or the other. This inquiry often depends on previous case law defining the
enumerated subjects' scope and substance. See, e.g., Reference re The Natural
Prods. Mktg. Act, 1936 S.C.R. 398, 408-09, affd, 1937 App.Cas. 377. If the legislation is expressly within § 91, it is not within § 92. Reference re Alberta Statutes, 1938 S.C.R. 100, 114-15, affd, 1939 App.Cas. 117. The reverse is not
always true, however, legislation expressly within § 92 may be preempted by
the Dominion if necessary to exercise its own exclusive jurisdiction, Reference
re The Debt Adjustment Act, 1942 S.C.R. 31, 41-44 (Crocket, J., dissenting),
aff'd, 1943 App.Cas. 356., or if special circumstances warrant invoking § 91 general jurisdiction for the peace, welfare, and good government of Canada. See
Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, supra; Reference re Radio Communication Act, 1931 S.C.R. 541, 546-47; Reference re Validity of the Combines Investigative Act, 1929 S.C.R. 409, 419.
If the legislation is not exclusively within one section, the Court next reviews the subject matter to determine whether it is in "pith and substance"
within either section, and only incidentally infringes upon the other's jurisdiction. See Reference re § 498A of the Criminal Code, 1936 S.C.R. 363, 367-68,
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their highest court only after lengthy debate over the appropriateness of courts rendering advisory opinions 8
The important role of advisory opinions in Canadian constitutional history may surprise American lawyers imbued in the
teachings of the United States Supreme Court. Although some
state courts render advisory opinions,9 United States courts
have held since 1793 that the United States Constitution does
and should deny such jurisdiction to federal courts.10
Early in their law school careers, American lawyers learn
of the problems associated with advisory opinions. The most
important of these problems, as Chief Justice Jay wrote to
President Washington in 1793, is that judicial rendering of advisory opinions offends the separation of powers as enshrined in
the U.S. Constitution." The constitutional limitation of federal
court jurisdiction to cases or controversies helps to ensure this
separation of powers.' 2
Another problem is the hypothetical nature of advisory
opinions. Because advisory opinions do not bind affected parties, they may erode judicial authority.'3 Advisory opinions
prevent the adversary system from ensuring that both sides of
a question are well and fully argued, and increase the prospect
of collusive litigation. 14 Advisory jurisdiction, some argue, requires courts to interpret the Constitution in the context of hypothetical and abstract disputes, which may fail to illuminate
the true complexity of issues. 15 When limited to resolving acqffd,

1937 App.Cas. 368; Reference re Water and Water-Powers, 1929 S.C.R.

200, 217-19.
8. See B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 278 (concluding that from early in
Canadian constitutional history, "at both the federal and the provincial level,"
the reference procedure "was looked upon as an integral part of the function-

ing of the constitution" and "[t]here was [by 1891] a general assumption that
this was an important device for ensuring that neither Parliament nor the

Legislatures exceeded their constitutional powers").
9. Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and South Dakota all authorize judicial advisory opinions. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 73 n.4.
10.
11.

See supra note 1.
"[The lines of separation [are] drawn by the Constitution between the

three departments of the government. These being in certain respects checks
upon each other, and our being judges in a court of the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions [posed]." 3 H. JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 488.
12. U.S. CONST., art. m, § 2, cl. 1.

13.

J. NowAx, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 58 (3d ed.

1986).

14. I&
15.

See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.
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tual controversies, courts might be able to avoid needlessly ad16
dressing these constitutional issues.
Although Canadians continue to debate the extent and
scope of reference jurisdiction,17 the Canadian Supreme Court

rarely has examined its appropriateness since a 1910 opinion in
which the Court discussed extensively the constitutionality of
reference jurisdiction.'8 Canadians not only accept the
Supreme Court's advisory role, but they rely on the reference
procedure to resolve important constitutional questions. In just
over a century, the Canadian Supreme Court has rendered 115
reference opinions. 19

These opinions particularly should interest American lawyers and courts because they represent extensive experience
with the advisory functions of courts in a federal, constitutional
system. Studying these cases will allow Americans to assess the
nature and impact of judicial advice in Canada to determine
whether American concerns about advisory opinions are justified, and to decide whether the Canadian experience should
16. I&
17. See supra note 6 (discussing 1982 constitutional amendment
reference).
18. Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), qf'd, App.Cas. 571
(1912). This case is discussed in depth infa text accompanying notes 76-97.
19. See Appendix. This total is subject to debate. Although most references are titled as such, some are not. Determining whether this number includes every reference opinion is thus impossible without reading every
Supreme Court case, and even then it is not always clear. The problem is illustrated by a 1940 opinion titled Home Oil Distributors, Limited (Plaintiffs)
and Attorney-General of British Columbia, the Coal Petroleum Board (Defendants) 1940 S.C.R. 444. The question came on appeal from the Court of Appeals for British Columbia, where it had been raised under the Constitutional
Questions Determination Act, 54 B.C.R. 48 (1939), which authorized the provincial high court to entertain references. Except for the jurisdictional basis of
the provincial opinion and use of "and" rather than "v" in the title, nothing in
the Supreme Court opinion indicates it is rendered pursuant to the Court's
reference authority. In identifying the references discussed in this Article we
have relied on the case title and on citations to reference opinions in the
Supreme Court's opinions and in secondary sources. Thus, although we are
confident that we have identified almost every reference opinion, and certainly the most important ones, we cannot be certain that we have catalogued
every single one.
The task also is complicated by the fact that reference opinions do not always deal with purely abstract questions. Often the questions posed involve
specific situations and particular parties, making it difficult to distinguish references on the basis of their substantive content. The implications of this nonabstract nature of many references is addressed infra text accompanying notes
366-68.
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spur Americans to consider the addition of an advisory function
to federal court jurisdiction.
The bulk of this Article analyzes the 115 Canadian
Supreme Court reference opinions. 20 Part I reviews the history
of reference jurisdiction and describes its statutory basis. Part
II examines the theoretical and political arguments favoring
and opposing reference jurisdiction. Part III describes reference jurisdiction in practice. Part IV analyzes the role of references in defining the Canadian federation. Part V evaluates the
judicial advisory opinion in the context of the Canadian experience. Part VI discusses the possible relevance of the Canadian
experience to American federal courts. The Article concludes
that the success of the Canadian reference system should lead
American jurists and lawyers to re-think the long-standing
American rule against federal court advisory opinions.
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS AND STATUTORY BASIS OF
REFERENCE JURISDICTION
In 1910 Justice Duff observed that "[t]he... asking [of] the
extra judicial advice of the judges upon questions of law is an
ancient practice." 21 Until at least 1760, the English House of
Lords had exercised an entitlement requiring common law
judges to answer legal questions regardless of whether the
questions arose from pending litigation. 22 The judges presumably responded with advice they felt duty-bound to render, based
on convention rather than statute.2 This practice bridges, or
obscures, the separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive functions in the English system.2
20. This study analyzes only the reference jurisdiction of the Canadian
Supreme Court. The high court of every province performs the same function.
Until 1949, the English Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London

also gave advisory opinions on questions of Canadian law. See Lederman, The
Extension of Governmental Institutions and Legal Systems to British North

America in the Colonial Period, in CONTMUING CANADAN CONSTITUIONAL

DILEMMAs 63, 79 (1981). This Article considers Provincial and Privy Council
references only to the extent that they involve appeals to or from Supreme
Court references.
21. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434, 451 (1910).
22. Id.
23. The convention was rooted in the peculiar nature of the English
House of Lords with its Privy Council and Judicial Committee. Justice Duff
states that "the last recorded instance in England in which without statutory
authority such advice was sought by the Crown occurred in 1760, when a question... was submitted... and answered." Id.
24. The Canadian Constitution makes no express reference to the separation of powers nor to the parliamentary form of government. Parliamentary
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Although the Supreme Court of Canada was not modeled
after the English Privy Council, defenders of reference jurisdiction nevertheless found the Privy Council precedent persuasive, perhaps because the Supreme Court functioned initially as
a channel for importing English jurisprudence to Canada.2
Several phases mark Canada's incorporation of reference jurisdiction: 1) statutory establishment and acceptance (1875-1906);
2) constitutionalization (1906-1922); and 3) adaptation and adjustment (1922-present).
A.

STATUTORY ESTABLISHMENT AND ACCEPTANCE

(1875-1906)

Section 4 of the British statute constituting the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (Privy Council) provided the
statutory model for the Canadian legislation that created reference jurisdiction.26 Section 4 gave the Crown power to submit
references to the Privy Council.2 English common law also
allowed the Crown and courts to refer questions, but the scope
of these questions was "confined to the strict construction of
existing laws." 2s Given the Supreme Court's channeling funcgovernment exists at both the national and provincial levels and obscures any
separation of legislative and executive powers. Strayer states "that there is no
constitutional separation of powers at either the provincial or the federal level
in Canada." B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 125. Hogg agrees that the Constitution "does not separate the legislative, executive and judicial functions and insist[s] that each branch of government exercise only 'its own' function." P.
HOGG, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 150 (1985). Hogg points out that Canadian law differs from American law "in Canada's retention of the British
system of responsible government." Id. at 287. Notwithstanding this widely
accepted interpretation of the Canadian Constitution, separation of powers
proved to be a concern when the Court first addressed the validity of its reference jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 106-08.
25. Russell, The PoliticalRole of the Supreme Court of Canadain its First
Century, 53 CAN. BAR REv. 576, 583 (1975).

26. Justice Idington suggested this connection between the English and
Canadian statutes in Reference re Abstention From Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R.
581, 597 (1905) as did Chief Justice Fitzpatrick in Reference re References, 43
S.C.R. 536, 555 (1910), aff'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912). The English statute provided: "It shall be lawful for His Majesty to refer to the said Judicial Committee .... for hearing and consideration and such other matters whatsoever as
His Majesty shall think fit, and such Committee shall thereupon hear or consider the same, and shall advise His Majesty thereon in manner aforesaid."
Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Win. IV, ch. 41, § 4. Strayer confirms this
lineage and notes that the Judicial Committee Act of 1833 had earlier precedents in the English common law. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 182.
27. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 271-72 (stating also that § 4 "inspired the
introduction of [reference jurisdiction] into Canada").
28. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843); Reference re London and
Westminster Bank, 6 Eng.Rep. 1127 (1834). In both cases the Court deter-
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tion,2 9 Parliament understandably included reference jurisdiction when establishing the Canadian Court in 1875. Section 52
of the Canadian Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act authorized "the Governor in Council to refer to the Supreme Court
for hearing or consideration any matter whatsoever ... [and

provided that] the Court shall thereupon hear and consider the
same. '' 30 An additional provision also allowed either the Senate
or House of Commons to submit pending bills for referral to
the Court.3 ' Despite the several avenues of referral, the Canadian Supreme Court heard only seven references between 1875
and 1891.32
The Senate submitted most of these early references,
33
which usually questioned Parliament's incorporation powers.
These references reveal that the Court interpreted its reference
obligation narrowly, following English precedent. For example,
in Reference re New Brunswick Penitentiary,3 the Court cautioned against extra-judicial answers. It carefully restricted its
opinion, which concerned Parliament's power to exclude certain types of prisoners from a federally-funded penitentiary, to
an express interpretation of the relevant statute.35 This narrow
holding did not precisely address the question posed at hearing
by New Brunswick's Attorney-General; the Court believed the
province's position was too broad to be addressed.3 6 In narrowmined that the House of Lords could require the judges to answer abstract
questions of existing law.
29. Russell, supra note 25, at 583.
30. The Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875 CAN. STAT. ch. 11, § 52.
31. I § 53.
32. Reference re The Quebec Timber Company, Cout. Cas. 43 (1882); Reference re Canada Provident Association, Cout. Cas. 48 (1882); Reference re
New Brunswick Penitentiary, Cout. Cas. 24 (1880); Reference re The Bros. of
the Christian Schools in Canada, Cout. Cas., Apr. 4 (1874); Reference re The
Thrasher Case, B.C.R. 153 (1882); Reference re The McCarthy Act, Session Papers No. 85a (1885); Reference re The Jesuits' Estates Act, 1889 LEGAL NEWS
283.
33. The Court heard four Senate references before 1891: Reference re
The Quebec Timber Co., Cout. Cas. 43 (1882); Reference re the Canada Provident Assoc., Cout. Cas. 48 (1882); Reference re The Bros. of the Christian
Schools in Canada, Cout. Cas., Apr. 4 (1874); Reference re The McCarthy Act,
Session Papers No. 85a (1885) (although the Senate debated this reference, it
apparently was not reported in the Supreme Court Reporter or in Coutlee;
perhaps it was not actually submitted).
34. Cout. Cas. 24 (1880).
35. Id. at 24-25.
36. I& at 28-29; see Reference re The Quebec Timber Co., Cout. Cas. 43
(1882), in which the Court refused to answer certain questions because they
might have affected private rights.
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ing the question and its answer, this opinion helped establish
the framework for judicial opinions within a reference.
Apparently no one seriously contested the extent of the judicial role during this period. One case did raise the question,
however, of the purpose of a reference and the parties entitled
to submit one. In 1889, a private party petitioned the Governor
General, requesting the referral of questions related to the validity of several acts that had incorporated and settled the estates of a religious order.3 7 The province and the Dominion
questioned the party's standing. Canada's Minister of Justice
emphatically rejected the petition, stating that the interest of a
private citizen and taxpayer was insufficient to confer standing.38 He also concluded that reference jurisdiction was "in-

tended to enable the Governor-General to obtain an opinion
from the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to some order
which his government might be called on to make."3 9 The Minister reasoned that use of references by private parties easily
could deprive provincial courts of their functions, create due
process problems, and change reference power into a summary
procedure, rather than the advice it was meant to be.40

The

controversy over reference jurisdiction during this period reflects these concerns.
From 1867 to 1896, the Dominion vigorously asserted federal jurisdiction." The provinces perceived the standing problem and the reference's potential significance as threats to their
sovereignty.4 In 1887, five of the seven provinces conferred in
an interprovincial conference, passing several resolutions that
called for constitutional change.4 3 One suggested change involved the reference power. It proposed "equal facilities to the
Federal and Provincial Governments for promptly obtaining a
judicial determination respecting the validity of Statutes of
both the Federal Parliament and Provincial Legislatures.""
This proposal notably merged two continuing controversies.
First, provincial concern over equal access to judicial review of
37. Reference re the Jesuits' Estates Act, 1889 LEGAL NEWS 283.

38. I& at 284-85.
39. Id- at 286 (concluding also that use of reference jurisdiction to adjudicate private disputes would pervert it "into an arbitrary and inquisitorial
power").
40. I& at 286-87.
41. B. Strayer, supra note 6, at 274.
42. IM at 274-75.
43. IM at 275.
44. Id- (quoting OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTER-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE, 1887, 28 (1887).
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both federal and provincial laws underscored their claims of
sovereignty. This controversy was not resolved until 1922.

Second, the provinces' threatened exclusion from the federal
system underscored their fear of the potential power of a reference opinion. 46
Although the conference proposal was never enacted,4 7 it
did result in provincial statutory reference systems. Within ten
years of the conference, five provinces enacted reference statutes,48 and by 1953 all the provinces had reference jurisdiction.49 These statutes accomplished the conference proposal's
goals: they created access to the province's highest court for judicial review of federal and provincial laws, and they deemed
the provincial court's decision a final judgment, which created a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court and a potential appeal to
the English Privy Council.-'5
The Dominion and Parliament rarely submitted references
during this early period,5 1 possibly because the provinces believed that the reference procedure threatened their sovereignty. More likely, the Dominion and Parliament rarely used
references because they perceived deficiencies in the reference
procedure. In 1891, Parliament amended the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act to remedy these shortcomings. 52 These
changes extended the reference scope to disallowance, 53 education, and questions of law or fact. They also obliged the Court
to certify its reasons and give notice and opportunity for hear45. See text accompanying infra note 66.
46. This provincial assessment seems obvious and prophetic given that the
majority of references in the next 100 years concerned federalism issues. See
infra note 214.
47. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 275.
48. Manitoba (1890), Nova Scotia (1890), British Columbia (1891), Ontario
(1891), Quebec (1898). I& at 275 n.17.
49. Northwest Territories (1901) (later applied to Alberta and Saskatchewan), New Brunswick (1928), Prince Edward Island (1941), Newfoundland
(1953). I& at 275 n.18.
50. I& at 277-78.
51. See supra note 32.
52. An Act to amend Chapter one hundred and thirty five of the Revised
Statutes entitled, "An Act respecting the Supreme and Exchequer courts,"
CAN. STAT. ch. 25, § 4 (1891) [hereinafter "1891 Amendment"].
53.
LdAs a result, § 90 of the BNA Act provides that provincial legislation is subject to the federal government's powers of reservation and disallowance. BNA Act, supra note 7, § 90. Disallowance allows the government to
invalidate a provincial statute. Although the Dominion often used this power
early in Confederation history, Hogg states that the "modern development of
...judicial review and democratic responsibility has left no room for [its] exercise" and it has not been used since 1943. P. HoGG, supra note 24, at 90.
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ing to the Attorney General of any province whose interests
were involved in a reference proceeding. 54 Finally, the amendments provided that a reference would be a final judgment for
purposes of appeal to the English Privy Council. 5
These amendments, together with provincial statutes enacted between 1875 and 1906, solidified reference jurisdiction in
Canada. This period embodied a struggle between federal and
provincial sovereignty, resulting in the development of independent provincial reference systems. During this time, no
54. 1891 Amendment, supra note 52.
55. Id- The 1891 Amendment stated in part:
Important questions of law or fact touching provincial legislation, or
the appellate jurisdiction as to educational matters vested in the Governor in Council by 'The British North America Act, 1867, or by any
other Act or law, or touching the constitutionality of any legislation of
the Parliament of Canada, or touching any other matter with reference to which he sees fit to exercise this power, may be referred, by
the Governor in Council, to the Supreme Court for hearing or consideration; and the court shall thereupon hear and consider the same:
2. The court shall certify to the Governor in Council, for his information, its opinion on questions so referred, with the reasons
therefor, which shall be given in like manner as in the case of a judgment upon an appeal to the said court; and any judge who differs
from the opinion of the majority shall, in like manner, certify his
opinion and his reasons:
3. In case any such question relates to the constitutional validity
of any Act which has heretofore been or shall hereafter be passed by
the Legislature of any Province, or of any provision in any such Act,
or in case, for any reason, the Government of any Province has any
special interest in any such question, the Attorney General of such
Province, or, in the case of the North-West Territories, the Lieutenant Governor thereof, shall be notified of the hearing, in order that he
may be heard if he thinks fit:
4. The court shall have power to direct that any person interested, or, where there is a class of persons interested, any one or more
persons as representatives of such class, shall be notified of the hearing upon any reference under this section, and such persons shall be
entitled to be heard thereon:
5. The court may, in its discretion, request any counsel to argue
the case as to any interest which is affected and as to which counsel
does not appear, and the reasonable expenses thereby occasioned may
be paid by the Minister of Finance and Receiver General out of any
moneys appropriated by Parliament for expenses of litigation:
6. The opinion of the court upon any such reference, although advisory only, shall, for all purposes of appeal to Her Majesty in Council, be treated as a final judgment of the said court between parties:
7. General rules and orders with respect to matters coming
within the jurisdiction of the court under this section may be made in
the same manner and to the same extent as is provided by this Act,
with respect to other matters within its jurisdiction, and, in particular,
such rules and orders as to the judges making them seem best for the
investigation of questions of fact involved in any reference
thereunder.
1891 Amendment, supra note 52.
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one seriously challenged the federal procedure, and by 1891
courts had accepted the technical validity of reference
jurisdiction. 6
B.

CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF REFERENCE JURISDICTION

(1906-1922)
Because the Canadian Supreme Court generally refused to
accept the provinces' references on appeal, 57 the provinces challenged the constitutionality of reference jurisdiction. In Attor-

ney Gen. (Ont) v. Attorney Gen. (Can.), 6 the Privy Council
affirmed a Supreme Court opinion that firmly established the
constitutionality of reference jurisdiction and the Court's duty
to answer referred questions.5 9 The Privy Council concluded
that the British North America Act (BNA Act) would be subverted if Parliament lacked a power incidental to its self-government.60 Parliament thus necessarily had the authority to
confer reference jurisdiction on the Supreme Court.6 1 Two factors were critical to the Privy Council decision. Because the
BNA Act did not clearly separate powers, it allowed courts to
perform traditionally non-judicial functions, such as rendering
advisory opinions. 6 2 The Privy Council noted further that most
63
of the provinces had enacted statutory reference systems.
That factor seriously undermined the provinces' position on the
constitutionality of references. 64 Failing to prove reference jurisdiction was ultra vires the Court, the provinces resumed
56. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 274. A later amendment, An Act to
amend the "Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act," CAN. STAT. ch. 50, § 2
(1906), only clarified the earlier revisions and did not extend or limit the statute's scope.
57. In Union Colliery Co. v. Attorney Gen. for B.C., 27 S.C.R. 637 (1897),
British Columbia attempted to appeal a reference opinion from its Supreme
Court. Id. at 639. Typical of the provincial statutes, B.C.'s reference statute
"deemed" the Court's opinion a "judgment." IH. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, found it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. I&. The opinion
seems contradictory, given its own amended statute. See supra note 52. The
Court reasoned that the phrase "deemed a final judgment" inherently reveals
that a reference opinion is not really a final judgment because "there is no action, no parties, [and] no controversy." 27 S.C.R. at 639. The Court thus could
not review the reference opinion.
58. App.Cas. 571 (1912).
59. Reference re Reference Jurisdiction, 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), aff'd,
App.Cas. 571 (1912).

60. !1. at 581.
61. 1& at 582.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 588.
Id
I&
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pressing for appellate access to the Court.65
C.

ADAPTATION AND ADJUSTMENT

(1922-PRESENT)

A 1922 statutory amendment granted the provinces access
to the Supreme Court.6 The amendment modified sections of
the Supreme Court Act, enabling a province to appeal a reference to the Supreme Court if there were a sufficient statutory
basis. Since 1922, Parliament has enacted minor alterations to
the basic reference provisions,67 but the general purpose and
scope remain the same.68 Reference use, however, has changed.
65. Between 1891 and 1922, the provinces appealed numerous references

that the Supreme Court denied on the rationale of Union Colliery Co. v. Attorney Gen. for B.C., 27 S.C.R. 637 (1897). Some examples are Union Bank of
Halifax v. Dickie, 41 S.C.R. 13 (1908); Wenger v. Lamont, 41 S.C.R. 603 (1909);
Clarke v. Goodall, 44 S.C.R 284 (1911); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 44
S.C.R. 616 (1911); and Dunn v. Eaton, 47 S.C.R. 205 (1912).
66. An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, CAN. STAT. 1922, ch. 48, § 1.
67. The Supreme Court Act, 1927, R.S.C. ch. 35, § 55 (1927).
68. The modern Supreme Court Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. S-26, § 53 (1985)
provides in pertinent part(1) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning
(a) the interpretation of the Constitution Acts;
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation, of any federal or
provincial legislation;
(c) the appellate jurisdiction respecting educational matters,
by the Constitution Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law vested
in the Governor in Council; or
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legislatures of the provinces, or of the respective governments thereof,
whether or not the particular power in question has been or is
proposed to be exercised.
(2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing
and consideration important questions of law or fact concerning any
matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court qjudem generis
with the enumerations contained in subsection (1), with reference to
which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit any such question.
(3) Any question concerning any of the matters mentioned in
subsections (1) and (2), and referred to the Court by the Governor in
Council, shall be conclusively deemed to be an important question.
(4) Where a reference is made to the Court under subsection (1)
or (2), it is the duty of the Court to hear and consider it and to answer
each question so referred, and the Court shall certify to the Governor
in Council, for his information, its opinion on each question, with the
reasons for each answer, and the opinion shall be pronounced in like
manner as in the case of a judgment on an appeal to the Court, and
any judges who differ from the opinion of the majority shall in like
manner certify their opinions and their reasons.
(5) Where the question relates to the constitutional validity of
any Act passed by the legislature of any province, or of any provision
in any such Act, or in case, for any reason, the government of any
province has any special interest in any such question, the attorney
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Parliament abolished appeals to the English Privy Council in
1949.69 Less apparent has been the trend toward judicial resolution of inherent weaknesses in references. Admission of evidence, use of factums, and loosening of standing requirements
all reveal adjustments intended to respond to the traditional ar70
guments against advisory opinions.
The evolution of reference jurisdiction established its procedural and constitutional validity, while adjusting its use to
7
federal-provincial tensions and fear of its potential influence. '
Although reference jurisdiction differs by nature from most judicial functions, the lack of procedural controversy attests to its
acceptance within Canada as an integral part of judicial review.
II.

REFERENCE JURISDICTION IN THEORY

Reference proceedings are an established part of Supreme
Court practice in Canada. 72 This modern acceptance, however,
general of the province shall be notified of the hearing in order that
the attorney general may be heard if he thinks fit.
(6) The Court has power to direct that any person interested or,
where there is a class of persons interested, any one or more persons
as representatives of that class shall be notified of the hearing on any
reference under this section, and those persons are entitled to be
heard thereon.
(7) The Court may, in its discretion, request any counsel to argue
the case with respect to any interest that is affected and with respect
to which counsel does not appear, and the reasonable expenses
thereby occasioned may be paid by the Minister of Finance out of any
moneys appropriated by Parliament for expenses of litigation.
69. An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, 1949 CAN. STAT. ch. 37, § 3.
In Reference re the Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, 1949
S.C.R. 1, aff'd, 1951 App. Cas. 179, the Privy Council granted a special leave to
appeal. This was the final Canadian reference appealed to this body. See P.
HOGG, supm note 24, at 168.
70. For specific examples of references introducing or discussing these innovations, see Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581,
587 (1905) (counsel represented various private interests); Reference re The
Tariff Bd. of Commerce, 1934 S.C.R. 538 (a reference motivated by a Canadian
manufacturer); Reference re Home Oil Dist., 1940 S.C.R. 444 (private parties
named within the context of an actual dispute); Reference re Persons of the
Japanese Race, 1946 S.C.R. 248 (motivated by organizations representing individual rights), qffd, 1947 App.Cas 87; Reference re The Wartime Leasehold,
1950 S.C.R. 124 (discussing the admission and use of evidence); Reference r6
The Real Property Act, 1958 S.C.R. 285 (acknowledging due process requirements in references).
71. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 350 (N.
Lyon & R. Atkey, eds.1970) (suggesting reference use is declining because
provinces continue to view Court as both judge and agent for federal government). A resurgence in references during the last decade suggests this prediction was wrong. See Figure I, in text at infra note 208.
72. As early as 1929, the Supreme Court, while recognizing the difficulties
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follows strenuous past debate in cases and scholarly journals.
A review of this debate is important in assessing whether the
theoretical advantages and/or disadvantages of reference proceedings are manifested in practice. Because the arguments in
favor of the Court's reference function usually arise in response
to the arguments against the function, it is most fruitful to examine the latter first.
A.

ARGUMENTS FOR LIMrrING REFERENCE JURISDICTION

Three overlapping categories divide the arguments for limiting Supreme Court reference jurisdiction. Constitutional arguments primarily involve interpretation of the BNA Act as it
relates to federalism and separation of powers. 73 Other arguments focus on interpretation of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional statutes. 74 Finally, commentators advance a host of
policy arguments favoring judicial self-restraint, if not formal
limitations on reference jurisdiction. 75
1. Constitutional Arguments
a. Federalism
Federalism has been the center of debate over reference jurisdiction and the dominant issue of Canadian constitutional
law throughout the nation's history. 76 The most important reference case in the Supreme Court's history, References re References,77 involved federalism. At issue was whether the Court
had jurisdiction to consider previously referred questions of
provincial versus Dominion legislative power. The Supreme
Court decided Reference re References on the motion of several
provinces that objected to the Court's exercise of reference jurisdiction. The provinces objected to the Court's consideration
hypothetical issues pose, stated "[tihe authority of the Governor in Council to
submit these questions under the statute, and the validity of the statute itself
are no longer open to question." Reference re Waters and Water-Powers, 1929

S.C.R. 200, 227.
73. Until 1982 the British North America Act, an enactment of the British

Parliament, served as the principal document of the Constitution of Canada.
In 1982 that law and several amendments to it were "patriated" under the
Constitution Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). For the first time in Canadian history,
amending the Constitution became the exclusive domain of Canadians.
74. See inkfra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.

76. See, e.g., REsHAPING CONFEDERATION: THE 1982 REFORM OF THE CANADIAN CONsTrruTION 325-69 (1984); J. MALLORY, THE STRUCTURE OF CANA.
DiAN GOVERNMENT (1971).
77. 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), aff'd, App.Cas. 571 (19.12).
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of various questions relating to provincial powers to incorporate
companies and to regulate or limit the activities of companies
incorporated by the Dominion or other provinces. 78 The provinces also objected to the Court's consideration of questions relating to provincial regulation of coastal fishing.79 The
provinces argued that the Court's reference jurisdiction under
Section 60 of the Supreme Court Act depended on that provision's validity under Sections 101 and 92(14) of the BNA Act.8 0
Section 101 of the BNA Act authorized the Dominion Parliament to "provide for the Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada and for the
Establishment of any additional Courts for the Better Administration of the Laws of Canada." 8 1 In Section 60 of the Supreme
Court Act, the Dominion Parliament granted the Supreme
Court reference jurisdiction over "questions of law or fact
touching... [t]he constitutionality or interpretation of any...
provincial legislation."8 2 The provinces argued that Section 101
did not authorize this grant, because the reference jurisdiction
involved neither an appellate function nor the administration

of Canadian laws.83
Justice Idington had suggested this argument earlier in
Reference re Criminal Code,8 but in dissent in Reference re
References he acknowledged that although Section 101 alone
did not clearly authorize reference jurisdiction, the section together with Section 92(14) and Section 67 of the Supreme Court
Act was sufficient for the creation of reference jurisdiction.8
The limit Section 67 imposed, requiring provincial consent, was
central to Justice Idington's dissent, as was the requirement
that cases involving provincial law be an exercise of appellate
86
jurisdiction after local courts had answered the question.
Justice Girouard put the argument slightly differently,
reading Section 101 to authorize creation of a "general court of
78.

I.

at 537-39.

79. I& at 540. The Court later answered these questions in Reference re
B.C. Fisheries, 47 S.C.R. 493 (1913), affd, 1914 App.Cas. 153.
80. Quebec and British Columbia consented to the references concerning
"Fisheries," and the "Insurance Act." Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. at
545. Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island
and Alberta objected to the reference. I at 537.
81.
82.

BNA § 101.
Supreme Court Act, 3 R.S.C. ch. 139, § 60 (1906).

83.
84.
85.
86.

43 S.C.R. at 543.
43 S.C.R. 434, 441 (1910).
43 S.C.R. at 567 (Idington, J., dissenting).
See id
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appeal for Canada" and separate courts "for the better administration of the laws of Canada." In Justice Girouard's opinion
the Supreme Court was the general court of appeal and therefore could not sit also as an "additional court for the administration of the laws of Canada."8 7 Justice Idington agreed that
"[t]he question of separation.., or of consolidation [of one or
more judicial powers is] entirely [a] matter of convenience and
expedience."' s Justice Idington insisted, however, that absent
provincial consent and proper appellate procedural posture,
Section 101 limited the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to administering the laws of Canada.8 9
The Supreme Court rejected this argument under Section
101 on the ground that "the language of... section [101] is
quite broad and ample enough to confer the required and assumed power." 90 The Court reasoned, moreover, that the existence of previously unchallenged Supreme Court jurisdiction
over other reference questions 9 ' supported the validity of Section 60 of the Supreme Court Act.92
The provinces, having failed in their argument under Section 101 of the BNA Act, urged that Section 92(14) of that Act
rendered application of reference jurisdiction to provincial laws
unconstitutional. Even if Section 101 authorized Section 60, the
provinces argued, the subject matter of the law still must be
within Dominion, as opposed to provincial, powers. 93 Section 91
of the BNA Act enumerates the Dominion Parliament's powers, including the general power to "make Laws for the Peace,
order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects... assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces."94 Provincial
powers under section 92 of the BNA Act encompass "[t]he Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitu87. i at 557 (Girouard, J.). The Chief Justice rejected this argument,
quoting an earlier opinion to the effect that "[t]he distinction between creating
a new court and conferring a new jurisdiction upon an existing court is but a
verbal and non-substantial distinction." Id at 553 (quoting Valin v. Langlois, 5
App.Cas. 115 (1879)).
88. I at 569. (Idington, J., dissenting).
89. Id at 575 (noting that "administering the laws of the provinces is a
thing beyond the literal meaning of the [statute]").
90. 1i at 562 (Davies, J.).
91. In particular, questions referred under the Railway Act. I& at 557
(Fitzpatrick, C.J.).
92. Id at 564.
93. I at 541.
94. BNA § 91.
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tion, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts."9 5
The provinces argued that provincial courts established under
Section 92(14) have exclusive authority to issue opinions on the
constitutionality of provincial laws.9 6
The Court rejected this constitutional argument as contrary to the established interpretation of Section 92 of the BNA
97
Act.

b. Due Process
A second constitutional objection to the reference focused
on individual rather than provincial rights.9 8 Counsel in Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour 99 urged that references on pending provincial legislation would violate the rights
"not only of provincial legislatures, but of the individual citizens in the province."' 0 0 The reference opinion would directly

affect individual rights without the affected individuals having
notice of the reference proceedings or an opportunity to
participate. 01
Criminal trials in particular implicate the due process objection to references. 0 2 Courts might violate the rights of criminal defendants by following reference opinions when faced
103
with an actual controversy in the criminal case.
95. BNA § 92.
96. 43 S.C.R. at 541-42.
97. Id at 552.
98. Others have characterized the concerns for private rights and judicial
administration as ethical objections to the reference system. See, eg., Rubin,
The Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional
Law, 6 McGILL L.J. 168, 175 n.24 (1960).

99. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
100. Id. at 588-89.
101. Under the American view, this is "due process," a concept rooted for
some in natural law and for others in the Constitution. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUIoNAL LAW 666-67 (2d ed. 1988). In the Canadian Constitution,
the parallel concept seems to be "fundamental justice," but the term, like
American due process, encompasses more than the British natural justice. See
P. HOGG, supra note 24, at 746-47.
102. Justice Manle stated in his celebrated opinion in Macaghten's Case:
"[A]s these questions relate to matters of criminal law of great importance and
frequent occurrence, the answers to them by the judges may embarrass the administration of justice, when they are cited in criminal trials." 10 Cl. & F. 200,
204 (1843). MclVaghten's Case concerned an accused's criminal actions, committed under the influence of insane delusion. The Court addressed several
questions of law concerning mental illness and culpability. Although the
Court cautioned against "minute applications of [broad] principles," it nevertheless held that the House of Lords has a right to require judges to answer
abstract questions of existing law.
103. Counsel in Reference re References reiterated Justice Manle's concern
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Beginning in 1929, the Court declined to answer some questions if answering would violate due process. 1°4 For example,
in a 1958 reference concerning title to mines and minerals
within railway land grants, the Court abstained from answering
one referred question because answering "would be contrary to
the fundamental conception of due process."'10 5
c. Separationof Powers
The federalism argument applies only to issues of provincial authority and the due process argument applies only to
cases affecting private rights. The separation of powers argument potentially carries greater impact, because it holds that
extra-judicial advice is simply not a proper part of the judicial
role.
One example of the separation of powers argument is Justice Idington's dissent in Reference re Abstention from Sunday
Labour,l°6 in which the Court decided that the Ontario legislafor the fair administration of justice, noting that references were "not brought
...through the usual and proper channel, with the usual procedure devised to
safeguard the interests of parties." 43 S.C.R. at 544. Justice Idington stated
the concern as one associated with any ex parte proceeding. "What right have
we," asked Idington, "to jeopardize their [interested private parties] stability
by expressing any opinion on an ex parte application.. .?" Id. at 572. '"he
very questions [posed in a reference] may involve the solution of the exact
point in some case now on its way here in a due, orderly and ordinary way;
why forestall the rights of these suitors?" I at 573. Justice Idington went so
far as to appeal to the Magna Carta in claiming that this process was a "taking
away of men's rights or liberties, without the process of law." I at 583. "Was
it not," he asked, "the fundamental reason that led to the remonstrances that
brought about the granting of the great charter that such things should not
thenceforth be done?" Id
104. In the 1929 Reference re Waters and Water-Powers, Justice Duff,
writing for the Court, noted "the impracticability of giving . .. answers to
some of the questions submitted... Mhe limit of practicability seems to be
reached, when the principles to which reference must be made for the determination of particular cases have been indicated." 1929 S.C.R. 200, 226-27.
105. Reference re An Act for Expediting the Decision of Constitutional
and Other Provincial Questions, 1958 S.C.R. 285, 294. As authority, the Court
cited several opinions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Attorney Gen. for Canada v. Attorneys Gen. for Ont., Que. & N.S., 1898 App.Cas.
700, 717 (P.C.) (Can.); Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Hamilton St. Ry., 1903
App.Cas. 524, 529 (P.C.) (Can.); Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen.for
Can., 1912 App.Cas. 571, 589 (P.C.) (Can.); Attorney Gen.for B.C. v. Attorney
Gen. for Can., 1914 App.Cas. 153, 162 (P.C.) (Can.); Attorney Gen. for Ont. v.
Attorney Gen. for Can., [1916] 1 App.Cas. 598, 602 (P.C.) (Can.). In one of
these Privy Council appeals the Judicial Committee declined to answer because the "proprietors are not parties to this litigation or represented before
their Lordships." 1898 App.Cas. at 717.
106. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
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ture had no authority to a adopt a proposed law.107 Justice Idington criticized the decision as "a departure from the
recognized principle of severing and keeping as distinct as possible the respective powers and duties of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of Government."' 0 8
2. Statutory Jurisdiction Arguments
Another argument in favor of limiting reference jurisdiction is based on the Supreme Court's jurisdictional statutes. In
1905 the Supreme Court decided it lacked jurisdiction to answer references concerning the constitutionality of legislation a
province might enact in the future, but found it had jurisdiction
to assess the constitutionality of actual provincial legislation.10 9
In so concluding, the Court applied the interpretive rule ejusdem generis 0 to the "touching any other matter" language of
Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act."' The Court reasoned
that the meaning of the general words "touching any other
matter" was limited by the preceding language of Section 3 of
the Supreme Court Act, which described the Court as "[a] court
107. Id. at 592. A draft of the law had been submitted to the Court. Id at
583-87.
108. Id at 603 (Idington, J., dissenting). Judicial consideration of "future
possible legislation before the matter has passed through the beneficent [sic]
ordeal of public discussion, parliamentary investigation, and solemn determination in... Parliament or Legislative Assembly is," said Justice Idington, "an
innovation" fraught with such far reaching consequences that it should be rejected by the Court. Id Justice Idington renewed his separation of powers argument five years later in Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), aff'd,
App.Cas. 571 (1912). The provinces, objecting to Supreme Court reference jurisdiction, argued that Parliament had no power to compel the Supreme Court
to give advice. Id at 543. Justice Idington agreed, contending that reference
jurisdiction made the Court "an advisory adjunct of the Department of Justice," a function "subaltern law officers of the Crown" usually performed. Id.
at 567 (Idington, J., dissenting). Justice Idington insisted that imposing advisory duties on the Court would "degrade this Court" and "destroy a fundamental principle of our government." Id. at 582. '"The production of a thesis"
on abstract legal questions "might be a profitable mental exercise," but it was
"beyond the scope and purview of anything permitted by the 'British North
America Act' as part of any judicial duty." I&
109. Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581, 591
(1905).
110. Id- Eusdem generis, as stated by Lord Campbell, requires that
"where there are general words following particular and specific words, the
general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified."
Id. at 600-01 (quoting Lord Campbell).
111. Id at 591. The version of the relevant Act before the Court was the
Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 2 R.S.C. ch. 135, § 37 (1886).
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of common law and equity."" 2 Such a court, it had been ar3
gued, had jurisdiction only in actual cases.1
3. Policy Arguments
The usually speculative nature of the Court's task in a reference case bottoms the most repeated policy argument against
reference jurisdiction. This argument applies to all references,
regardless of their subject matter and without relation to the
federal structure of the Canadian Dominion. The argument
holds that courts require the specific facts of an actual controversy to illuminate the complexities of legal issues, and courts
therefore should not and cannot resolve abstract legal
questions.
In the Reference re Abstentionfrom Sunday Labour,"4 the
Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of
proposed provincial legislation." 5 Counsel for the Canadian
Copper Company objected, arguing that the Court's reference
jurisdiction extended only to "Act[s] actually passed by a provincial legislature" and not to "speculative or academical questions as to the powers possessed by such legislature."" 6 The
Court agreed in principle, but proceeded to answer the questions because "the practice of this Court heretofore has been to
answer questions similar to those now submitted."" 7
In Reference re Criminal Code" 8 Justice Duff explained
112. Id. at 588, 591. See Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 2 R.S.C. ch.

135, § 3 (1886).
113. 35 S.C.R. at 592-94. Justice Sedgewick dissented, finding no difference
between considering the constitutionality of proposed or actual provincial legislation. Justice Idington concurred with the majority, however, while maintaining that provincial sovereignty prohibited the Governor General from
submitting actual or hypothetical questions of provincial law. In every prior
reference concerning provincial law, argued Justice Idington, the province consented to the submission. He discussed several such references, concluding
that he "would prefer to attribute the Court's action in these cases to... [provincial and Dominion] consent." I& at 600.
114. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
115. Id at 581.
116. I& at 588.
117. Id. at 592. Justice Idington agreed that the Court lacked jurisdiction,
but disagreed with the decision to proceed because of past practice. Id. at 602
(Idington, J., dissenting). He acknowledged that the Court answered similar
questions in the past, but objected "that not in a single case had the right or
power been challenged by any of the parties, and hence never argued, till this
reference." Id Furthermore, said Justice Idington, "[n]one of the cases have
gone so far ... as would be required here, to answer speculative questions."
Id. at 603.
118. 43 S.C.R. 434 (1910).
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one of the principle reasons for objecting to references in hypothetical cases. He stated that the Court should refuse "to answer questions the replies to which might properly be
influenced by the circumstances in which the questions should
arise for actual judicial decision.""19 Justice Duff's concern was
in part that such decisions would "tend 'to embarrass the administration of justice,"' 2 0 but also that a court cannot articulate useful legal principles based on speculation about actual
application of those principles.-2 ' Justice Duff reiterated the
argument in detail nineteen years later in Reference re Waters
and Water-Power,122 noting "the difficulty, indeed the impracticability, of giving precise and categorical answers to some of
the questions submitted."12s He cited Attorney Gen.. for British
Columbia v. Attorney Gen. for Canada'24in which the English
Privy Council found it "practically impossible to define a principle adequately and safely without previous ascertainment of
the exact facts,"'' 2 and John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton' 26 in
which the Privy Council predicted that opinions based on hypothetical circumstance "must almost certainly miscarry."''t
Although by 1950 no one questioned the Court's jurisdiction to render advisory opinions, the Court remained concerned
about the difficulties involved. Chief Justice Rinfret explored
the question in Reference re Wartime Leasehold Regulations.28
After noting that the Court was "limited to the statements of
fact contained in the Order of Reference" and those other facts
"of which it could ordinarily take judicial notice,"'29 Chief Justice Rinfret asserted that questions about "the constitutionality
of legislation disputed on the ground of colourability should really be brought before the courts not on a Reference, but in an
ordinary case."1 30 As recently as 1981, the Supreme Court ex119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 453.
Id (quotation omitted).
Id,
1929 S.C.R. 200.

123. Id at 226.
124. 1914 App.Cas. 153 (P.C.) (Can.).
125. Id. at 162.
126. 1915 App.Cas. 330 (P.C.) (Can.).

127. Id. at 339. Justice Smith concurred in Justice Duff's opinion, elaborating on facts generally known, but not before the Court, to illustrate "the difficulty of giving general answers to... questions applicable to every possible

variation of facts and circumstances." 1929 S.C.R. at 233 (Smith, J.,
concurring).
128. 1950 S.C.R. 124.
129. 1d at 126.
130. Id, at 128. '"The 'colourability' doctrine is invoked when a statute bears

1272

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 74:1251

pressed concern about the "particular difficulty in a constitutional reference when only the bare bones of the statute arrive
for consideration."' 3'1
A problem associated with the speculative nature of many
references is that interested parties often are not represented.
This lack of representation may raise due process concerns,
particularly when a reference opinion affects unrepresented
parties who may be involved in subsequent litigation on the
same issue.
Finally, some argue that the Supreme Court should decline, on a policy basis, to answer references involving political
questions or moot issues. 132 The Court rejected both arguments
in the 1982 Reference re the Constitution of Canada.133 It rejected the political question argument, reasoning that even if
political questions were raised, constitutional issues also would
be present. 1' On the mootness claim, raised because Parliament proclaimed the Constitution Act of 1982 before the Court
had addressed the Act's constitutionality, the Court concluded
that "the importance of the constitutional issue" justified giving
an answer on appeal.135 In fact, the Court could have rejected
the mootness argument on the simple basis that references are
not actual cases in the first place and thus cannot become moot.
In sum, opponents of reference jurisdiction have argued
that it is unconstitutional under the BNA, contrary to provincial rights, violates separation of powers and due process, does
not come within the Supreme Court Act's jurisdictional grant,
the formal trappings of a matter within jurisdiction but in reality is addressed
to a matter outside jurisdiction." P. HoGG,supra note 24, at 322. For example,
in Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights, the Supreme Court found that
a Newfoundland statute purporting to be an exercise of the provincial expropriation power was actually a nullification of a hydropower contract and thus
outside the provincial jurisdiction. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, 335. Hogg notes that
"there is a very fine line between adjudication on policy and adjudication on
validity." P. HOGG,supranote 24, at 322. He cautions that courts should avoid
voicing disapproval on policy grounds in the interest of judicial neutrality. Id.
"The colourability doctrine can and should be stated without impugning the
legislative branch; it simply means that 'form is not controlling in the determination of essential character."' Id. (quoting Abel, The Neglected Logic of 91
and 92, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 487, 494 (1969)).
131. Reference re the Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, 721.
132. See, ag., Reference re the Constitution of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793,
805 (stating that the respondent had argued that the Supreme Court should
not answer the referred question because it was "purely political" and "had
become academic").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 805.
135. Id. at 806.
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and undermines fair judicial decision making. The Supreme
Court usually has rejected these arguments or has articulated
countervailing reasons why it should proceed. The debate accompanying Canadian acceptance of the reference process,
however, has had some impact on modern use of the reference
proceeding.
B.

ARGUMENTS FAVORING REFERENCE JURISDICTION

Although the Supreme Court has offered justifications for
its reference jurisdiction, much of the argument favoring references has been defensive. This is true not because there are no
positive arguments to be made, but because the reference system was an inheritance that required justification only after it
was questioned. The burden was on challengers to justify
change, rather than on defenders to justify the status quo.
1.

Constitutional Arguments

Proponents of the reference responded to detractors who
argued that the BNA Act did not authorize Parliament to provide for Supreme Court reference jurisdiction. 136 Observing
that Section 101 of the BNA Act permitted Parliament to create a court that could render advisory opinions, 3 7 Chief Justice
Fitzpatrick reasoned that Parliament also could confer reference jurisdiction on an already-existing court.'38
Proponents of reference jurisdiction also found authority in
Section 91 of the BNA Act, which authorized legislation for the
136. "[I]t will not be suggested," argued Chief Justice Fitzpatrick, "that the
Imperial Parliament could not constitutionally confer upon the Canadian Legislature the power to establish a court competent to deal with such references." Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536, 552 (1910), aff'd, App.Cas. 571

(1912). In his view the language of Section 101 authorizing legislation for "the
better administration of the laws of Canada" "convey[ed] the widest discretion
of legislation." Id.
137. Id, at 552-53.
138. Id. at 553. Fitzpatrick quoted the Privy Council in support: "The distinction between creating a new court and conferring a new jurisdiction upon
an existing court is but a verbal and non-substantial distinction." Valin v. Langlois, [1879] 5 App.Cas. 115, 121 (P.C.). Justice Davies supported the Chief Justice's position, noting that § 101 granted power to the Canadian Legislature

"notwithstanding anything in this Act." 43 S.C.R. at 562. "It would seem only
right and proper," said Justice Davies, "that there should have been... some
means authorized by which opinions of some independent tribunal might be
obtained on such questions as related to the proper interpretation of the constitutional Act itself." Id. He concluded that "such an apparently desirable
objective was accomplished by the language of the 101st section." Id- at 562-63.
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"Peace, Order and good Government" of Canada. 139 Because
Section 91 empowered the Canadian legislature to grant reference jurisdiction, 140 Chief Justice Fitzpatrick did "not think it
could seriously be argued for a moment.., that power has not
been vested in the executive" to refer questions to the Court.141
This argument assumes that answering references involving provincial legislation does not infringe provincial rights. At
other times, the Court explicitly addressed the federalism issue.
139. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91 (U.K.).
140. "If any doubt remains as to the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament
[to grant reference jurisdiction to the Supreme Court] .. ., a reference to section 91... should dispel that doubt." 43 S.C.R. at 562-63.
141. 1I at 553-54. The Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875, 38 Vict.,
ch. 11, § 52, allowed the Governor in Council to refer anything "as he may
think fit" to the Court. It required the judges to certify both majority and minority opinions. The Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1886, 2 R.S.C. ch.
135, § 37, is essentially the same provision with some minor revisions. The
first important changes occurred in 1891. See The Supreme and Exchequer
Courts Act, 1891, 54-55 Vict. ch. 25, § 4 (amending § 37). Parliament in 1906
repealed subsections I and 2 of § 37. Act to amend the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1906, ch. 50, § 2. These changes primarily were structural,
clarifying the type of matters the Governor in Council could refer. For example, appellate jurisdiction over educational matters encompassed provisions of
any law orAct, as well as the BNA Act (emphasis identifies the changes). Id
This amendment did broaden reference power, however, by allowing reference jurisdiction over questions concerning the powers of Parliament, province Legislatures, or their governments "whether or not the particular power
in question has been or is proposed to be executed." Id. Furthermore, § 60(e)
decisively altered the phrase "touching any other matter," to read "any other
matter, whether or not in the opinion of the Court ejusdem generis with the
foregoing enumerations." Id.
The revisions of 1906 also subtly changed the judicial role. While the
1891 provisions stated that the Governor could refer questions to the Supreme
Court "for hearing or consideration," and that the Court "shall" certify its
opinion, the 1906 provisions seemed to respond to the issue of judicial discretion. The statute states, "it shall be the duty of the court to hear and consider"
any reference made to it. Supreme Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 139, § 60(2)

(1906).
In 1927, Parliament again clarified the language. Supreme Court Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 35, § 55 (1927). In 1956, Parliament repealed § 55(6) of the
1927 Act, which stated that reference opinions were advisory only and appealable as a final judgment. Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act and the Criminal Code, 1956 CAN. STAT. 321, 323 (§ 7). Repeal of the latter provision is
understandable, because Parliament abolished appeals to the Privy Council in
1949. Act Amending the Supreme Court Act, ch. 37, 1949 (2d Sess.), CAN.
STAT. 247, 249-50 (§ 3).

Repeal of the former provision is curious, because the

legislature may have intended reference opinions to assume a greater role
than advice. The present codification is substantively the same statute as the
1952 provision as amended in 1956, and remains the authority for reference jurisdiction. See Supreme Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. S-26, § 53 (1985).
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In Reference re References,142 the Chief Justice analogized
Supreme Court references on provincial laws to Privy Council

references on Canadian laws.143 He suggested that just as the

"Home Government" could refer questions to the Privy Council
"[b]efore exercising... [the] prerogative of rejection," so could
the Dominion government refer questions to the Supreme
Court "in connection with the power of supervision over pro14
vincial legislation entrusted to the Dominion Government."'
The Court refuted the oft-raised separation of powers complaint on two grounds. Justice Duff rejected the assertion that
separation of powers was relevant under the Canadian Constitution. He argued that "the first paragraph of the preamble of
the [BNA Act] discloses the intention that the Constitution of
Canada shall be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom."'145 The United Kingdom Constitution, he argued, embodied no separation of powers principle. 14 6
Justice Anglin maintained, moreover, that separation of
powers requiredthe Court to exercise reference powers. He argued that Parliament clearly had the authority to seek legal
counsel and to create a body of law officers for that purpose 47
He could find "nothing to prevent its requiring the discharge of
such duties by lawyers who happen to be members of... [the
Supreme] Court,"'41 and suggested that it was for Parliament,
not the Court, to determine "[t]he wisdom of such legislation as
a matter of policy."'14 9
142. 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), cff'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912).

143. Id- at 557.
144. 1&i In the same case Justice Davies argued that reference power must

extend to provincial laws because Dominion and provincial legislative powers
"are so interlaced that one can hardly be considered apart from the other." Id.
at 563.
145. Id at 588. '"Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one Dominion..., with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom." BNA Act, Preamble. See supra note 7.
146. '"There is nothing ...in the fact that this court is a court which according to traditional British notions is necessarily inconsistent with the exercise of [the reference jurisdiction]" 43 S.C.R. at 589.
147. Id at 593-94.
148. I at 594.
149. Id-at 594. Justice Idington rejected this argument. He agreed that
Parliament could create an advisory body, but disagreed that it therefore could
choose to have the Supreme Court perform the function. Id at 594 (Idington,
J., dissenting) He noted Parliament had powers to create bodies for other nonjudicial purposes and asked. "Can Parliament constitute this court a tariff
commission, a civil service commission, a conservation commission, a department for the management of any of the affairs of state.. " Id. at 581. "It is,"
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2. Tradition
The Court often has justified reference jurisdiction on the
basis that English and Canadian courts traditionally have exercised such jurisdiction.:'- The Court offers this argument
sometimes as evidence of the Constitution's meaning, 15 1 and
sometimes as a claim about the inherent nature of the reference function. 5 2 In fact, members of the Court occasionally
have asserted that reference power would exist even without
153
the BNA Act provisions or the Supreme Court Act.

By the time the Supreme Court first directly faced the jurisdictional issue in 1905, it already had answered numerous
references.'5 4 In the Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour,155 the majority, after explaining why the Court should
not answer the questions posed, proceeded nevertheless to answer them because "the practice of this Court heretofore has
been to answer questions similar to those now submitted."' s
Five years later, the Chief Justice said he was bound by earlier
cases that "established a rule of conduct which now has for me
he insisted, "a bare question of the power to impose any other than a judicial
duty." I&
150. See, e.g., id at 546 (Fitzpatrick, C.J.) ("Speaking for myself, I feel
bound by the rule established for us by those precedents which date back to
the very beginning of the court.").
151. See, e.g., id. at 564-66 (Davies, J,) (explaining the relationship between
reference jurisdiction and the English and Canadian constitutions).
152. See infra note 153.
153. In Reference re References, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick said that "even
in the absence of those special provisions in the 'British North America Act'
and the "Supreme Court Act,'. . . I would still hold that the members of this
court are the official advisers of the executive." 43 S.C.R. at 547. The Supreme
Court's historical position in relation to the Judicial Committee and the Provinces and Dominion may explain this inherent role. The Court was not the
final repository of Canadian justice until 1949. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 29.
The Court historically has acted as a tribunal for the Dominion and the provinces, and as a judicial and political representative of English standards the Judicial Committee expounded. Justice Idington, often a critic of the reference
proceeding, saw it as an "implied constitutional power... inherent in these
constituent bodies [the provinces and Dominion] mutually to protect and so far
as possible delimit their respective spheres of jurisdiction." 43 S.C.R. at 568.
Justice Duff insisted that the power to constitute a consultative body was "a
necessary adjunct to the legislative authority with which Parliament is invested." Id at 586.
154. The Court heard 16 references before the 1905 Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
155. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
156. Id at 592.
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the force of law."'157 In the same case Justice Davies noted that
"many of Canada's most distinguished jurists" have been involved in past references and none ever had raised the jurisdictional challenge.'ze
Probably no one raised the jurisdictional issue because
British law long recognized a reference proceeding' 5 9 In Reference re References,160 Chief Justice Fitzpatrick insisted the reference proceeding would exist even if no statute codified it,
because "the members of this court are the official advisers of
the executive in the same way as the judges in England are the
counsel or advisers of the King in matters of law."'16 1 The
Chief Justice analogized British governmental powers to Dominion governmental powers to explain how the British practice was relevant precedent. 162 The Court found British
precedent persuasive, although Justice Idington argued that
British reference precedent was inapplicable because the practice originated in "times when the separation of the legislative,
executive and judicial functions were not supposed to be as necessary,... a principle of modem constitutional government as

modern thought has held."'16 3 Justice Idington earlier had suggested that the Court look instead to United States Supreme
Court decisions for relevant precedent. 1
3. Nonbinding Nature
In defending reference jurisdiction the Court frequently
argues that because answers to the questions are merely advi157.

Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536, 546 (1910), aff'd, App.Cas. 571

(1912).
158. Id- at 564.
159. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.&. 434, 451 (1910). "It has long
been settled," wrote Justice Duff, "that the House of Lords is entitled to require the answers of the common law judges upon questions as to the existing
state of the law whether arising out of litigation pending before the House or
not." Id160. 43 S.C.R. 537 (1910), aff'd App.Cas. 571 (1912).
161. I& at 547.
162. I& at 557. Justice Duff suggested the same analogy. IM at 588.
163. Id-at 575 (Idington, J., dissenting).
164.

He cited J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNrrED STATES 388 (1833), and T. COOLEY, CONSTImONAL LIMITATIONS 192
(5th ed. 1883), and said "[tihere is much that is instructive ...in the constitutional history of the United States." Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581, 604 (1905). Five years later, he again urged the relevance
of United States law, arguing that long American experience with the separation of powers issue should make the Canadian court recognize "the wisdom of
making haste slowly." Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536, 580 (1910) (Idington, J., dissenting), ciff'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912).
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sory, some criticisms are irrelevant. Justice Girouard made this
argument in Reference re Criminal Code,165 in response to the
provincial claim that, because the reference was in reality an
appeal of a criminal case, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction.16 After expressing sympathy with the provincial concern,
Justice Girouard concluded that "as our advice has no legal effect, does not affect the rights of parties, nor the provincial decisions, and is not even binding upon us," he had no objection to
answering the reference. 167 Justice Davies made the same
point in explicit response to the provinces' federalism objections in Reference re References: "Being advisory only and not
binding upon the body to whom they are given [the Governor
General in Council] or upon the judges who give them they
cannot be said to be in any way binding upon the judges of any
of the provincial courts."' 6 This particular defense of the reference proceeding has not persuaded most critics.169
4.

Policy Arguments

Proponents also have defended the reference on the general policy ground that executive and legislative officials should
have the benefit of legal advice before they act. In Reference re
References, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick quoted Lord Campbell,
who had advised his colleagues in the House of Lords that
"[you] may be called on, in your legislative capacity, to change
the law and before doing so it is proper that you should be satisfied beyond a doubt what the law really is."'170
165.
166.
167.
168.

43 S.C.R. 434 (1910).
Id-at 435.
Id- at 436.
43 S.C.R. 536, 561 (1910), affld, App.Cas. 571 (1912). The provinces

maintained that Supreme Court exercise of reference jurisdiction in cases involving provincial laws interfered with provincial administration of justice
under § 92 of the British North America Act. Id at 541-42. Said Justice Duff:
'Ido not think the submission (for advice) of questions relating to the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces or the giving of such advice necessarily constitute such an interference with the administration of justice." Id. at 590.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 194-99.
170. 43 S.C.R. at 549 (quotation omitted). Justice Davies suggested that
such authority was surely granted, particularly for the purpose of interpreting
the Constitution Act. Id. at 562. Justice Duff argued that it might be "absolutely essential that Parliament be in a position to inform itself as thoroughly
as possible in advance of legislation... [to be advised] not only how far its own
powers extend... [but] what authority may be lawfully exercised by the provinces in relation to it." Id. at 587. "In all such cases," said Justice Duff, "the
advantage of trustworthy legal advice respecting the constitutional authority
of the Dominion and the provinces respectively must be evident." Id

199o]

CANADIAN ADVISORY OPINIONS

1279

Reference proponents also have argued that the reference
facilitates the purposes of the Constitution, particularly those
related to the federal structure. In the 1981 Reference re Residential Tenancies Act,' 71 the Court stated: "A constitutional
reference is not a barren exercise in statutory interpretation.
What is involved is an attempt to determine and give effect to
the broad objectives and purpose of the Constitution."' 72
C.

REFERENCE JURISDICTION AND PROVINCIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Because many references involve questions of provincial
versus Dominion legislative authority, the provinces often
claim that the Supreme Court violates their sovereignty by deciding references to which the provinces have not consented.
This argument develops in any dispute about division of legislative authority under the BNA Act because reference jurisdiction allows the Supreme Court of the Dominion to resolve a
dispute between the Dominion and a province. 73 If the provinces truly are sovereign, the argument contends, they need not
accept the Supreme Court's opinion on the extent of their
authority.
Justice Idington rooted his objection to the reference proceeding almost entirely in a concern for provincial sovereignty.
In the Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour,i74 he responded to the argument that numerous past references involving provincial legislative authority evidenced the legitimacy of
the proceeding, by insisting that the provinces had consented to
the earlier cases.175 Absent consent by the provinces, the
Supreme Court would have had no jurisdiction for the
reference.
171. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714.
172. Id. at 723. Counsel in the Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour told the Court that the reference "was intended to cover the case of questions actually arising from the action of rival legislative authorities." 35 S.C.R.

581, 588 (1905).
173. See supranotes 76-97 and accompanying text.
174. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
175. Id. at 598-600. "[I]n most of the cases there was in fact but a mutual
submission of points in dispute... [with] little regard had to the form, save as
a means of executing this mutual purpose .... ." Id. at 602. In Reference re
References, counsel for the provinces claimed that "with but one exception"
the provinces had consented to all prior references. 43 S.C.R. at 542. In that
case it was on the basis of provincial consent that Justice Idington thought the
Court should proceed with the reference to which British Columbia had consented, but not with the reference to which seven provinces had not consented. Id at 568 (Idington, J., dissenting).

1280

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1251

Reference proponents commonly respond that the provinces consented to references at the time of confederation. For
example, Justice Taschereau accepted the Court's jurisdiction
to hear references involving provincial legislation, but did "not
think that... [the Court was] called upon to determine what
was the law in any of the provinces before confederation."'176
The claim that the provinces consented at the time of confederation presumes the Supreme Court Act grants the Court such
jurisdiction, a claim reference opponents also dispute. 177
The Supreme Court Act as amended in 1922178 made clear
that provincial references could be appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Act, however, also strengthened the case for provincial consent as a prerequisite to Supreme Court consideration of references on questions of provincial law. Chief Justice
Anglin noted that Section 42a of the Act "seems to contemplate
the enactment of provincial legislation applicable generally to
references made to the highest court of final resort in the province."'379 Lacking enactment of such provincial legislation, Section 42a seems to preclude appeal of provincial references. 180
Thus, provincial consent, in the form of a statute declaring provincial court reference opinions final judgments, is necessary
for an appeal to the Supreme Court. This argument does not
make the general case for provincial consent, however, because
it applies only to appeals from provincial references. Issues of
provincial law still can be referred directly to the Supreme
176.

Reference re Fisheries, 26 S.C.R. 444, 540 (1896), qff'd, 1895 App.Cas.

700.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
178. An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, 1922, ch. 48, § 42a, 1922
CAN. STAT. 189. Under the Act appeal may be had from "an opinion pronounced by the highest court of final resort in any province on any matter referred to it... by the Lieutenant Governor... whenever it has been by the

statutes of said province declared that such opinion is to be deemed a judgment of the said highest court of final resort."
179. Reference re Education in Montreal, 1926 S.C.R. 246, 251, aqffd, 1928
App.Cas. 200.

180. In Reference re Education in Montreal, 1926 S.C.R. 246, cff'd, 1928
App.Cas. 200, the appeal was based not on a general statute like Justice Anglin
contemplated, but on special legislation declaring the provincial court's opinion in the particular case a final judgment. Id.at 250. Justice Anglin suggested
that "[i]t would seem improbable that Parliament contemplated enabling a
provincial legislature to single out a particular reference .. .[and] still less
that a specific judgment already rendered and not appealable when given
should... become the subject of such legislation." Id at 25. Justice Anglin
concluded, however, that the Court should hear the appeal because the provincial statute was "within the letter of s. 42a." I&i
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Court without provincial consent.181 Thus, Section 42a exhibits
more deference to provincial high courts than a recognition of
the need for provincial consent.

D.

REFERENCES

AS ADVISORY OPINIONS

A common response to many criticisms of the reference
proceeding is that reference opinions are purely advisory and
therefore have no legal impact on the provinces or other parties
to current or future legal disputes. 'We determine nothing,"
said Justice Taschereau in Reference re Fisheries, "[w]e are
mere advisers, and the answers we give bind no one, not even
ourselves."' 18 2

The Court's insistence that a reference is non-binding
presumes that reference decisions differ from judgments in actual cases. In distinguishing the two, the Court seldom has said
more than that reference opinions are non-binding. In the 1895
Fisheries reference, however, Justice Taschereau stated that
the Court's task was "to say what is the law as heretofore judicially expounded, not what is the law according to our opinion."1 83 This statement is puzzling, because saying what the
law is in the Court's opinion seems similar to saying what the
law is as "heretofore judicially expounded." Apparently, Justice Taschereau is suggesting that in an actual case the Court is
free to make law, while in a reference it may only state what
the law is.
181. The Supreme Court Act, supra note 68, provides in § 1(b) for the referral by the Governor General of any federal or provincial legislation.
182. 26 S.C.R. at 539. Fifteen years later, Justice Davies wrote that "I do
not think this court or its members would feel bound in any concrete case
which might arise hereafter by any expression of opinion we may now give on
these questions." Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434, 437 (1910). In
Reference re References, Justice Davies added that Supreme Court reference
opinions were not "in any way binding upon the judges of any of the provincial
courts." 43 S.C.R. at 561. In the same case the Chief Justice said that it should
not "be supposed for one moment that the Supreme Court will consider [itself]
bound by its reference opinions." I& at 550. Justices Duff and Anglin added
their voices to the chorus of agreement, the latter saying the Court was "free
to disregard it." Id- at 588, 592. Justice Davies also rejected the argument that
reference jurisdiction created a conflict between provincial power under § 92
and Dominion power under § 91 because it is not binding. I at 561. The
Court admitted "the futility of the proceeding" and justified it because "their
opinions bound no one." I& at 570. In Reference re Criminal Code, Justice
Girouard also dismissed the jurisdictional challenge as unimportant because of
the advisory nature of the reference proceeding. 43 S.C.R. at 436.
183. Reference re Fisheries, 26 S.C.R. 444, 539 (1895), cffd, 1895 App.Cas.
700.
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Implementing Justice Taschereau's distinction becomes difficult because common law discourse merges the two tasks.
With rare exception, courts justify opinions about what the law
is by citing past judicial opinions. Courts explain changes in the
law by distinguishing the case before the court from earlier
cases. A realist may insist, however, that courts really change
the law for policy reasons or because of judicial bias. For a
court actually to proceed differently in a reference than in a
case, it must rely exclusively on past decisions without regard
to the facts underlying the reference. The common law process
makes this extremely difficult, if not impossible. Common law
courts work in increments of specific cases rather than in general statements of broad legal principles. Even if a court can
state the law abstractly, it seldom will serve the needs of those
who seek the court's opinion. Academic treatises may reflect
an objective interest in the state of the law, but those seeking
reference opinions have particular applications in mind. Perhaps a court can adopt the treatise writer's attitude when deciding references and still perform as a common law court when
deciding actual cases. The absence of concrete facts in a reference would facilitate such chameleon-like behavior. The
Supreme Court, however, often searches for facts or assumes
them in references, 184 suggesting that it has difficulty performing the dual function Justice Taschereau described.
The claim that references are different from actual cases
may reflect the Court's recurrent insistence that the former are
non-binding. 185 Perhaps references are different because they
are non-binding, rather than non-binding because they are different. If theoretical arguments like Justice Taschereau's fail
to distinguish the reference opinion on the basis of its substance, only the nature of the reference process may explain
why the reference is non-binding. Justice Anglin urged that
"[ilt must be understood that as this opinion is given without
the advantage of argument except on behalf of the provincial
Attorney-General, it would not be proper that it should be
18 6
deemed binding."'

Although Justice Idington objected to this justification of
184.

See infra text accompanying notes 333-38.

185. See Rubin, supra note 98, at 175-76.
186. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434, 454 (1910). More often,
however, the Court simply asserts that the reference process does not raise
problems because it is non-binding, without explaining why it is non-binding.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing Court statements that
references are non-binding).
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the reference based on its nonbinding nature, 8 7 the argument
seems to have persuaded most members of the Supreme
Court. 18s Theoretical justifications of the reference as nonbinding, however, have not diminished its impact on Canadian

law.189

E. REFERENCES AS PRECEDENT
The concept of non-binding references implies that they
have no precedential significance. The Court has made the
point explicitly. In Reference re References, Justice Duff stated
that "[tihe opinions expressed do not . . . constitute judicial
precedents by which this court... can be bound or by which
any court whose judgments are appealable to this court can be
bound."'190 In the 1958 Reference re Water and Water-Powers,191 the Court stated that "the answers are only advisory and
will have no more effect than the opinions of law officers."'192
Theoretically, therefore, reference opinions are no different in
legal effect than opinions of executive officials who implement
laws or the legislative officials who enact laws. Justice Duff asserted that the Supreme Court "should be ready 'without difficulty to change' their opinion" when an actual case later raised
19 3
a question previously decided by reference.
It is one thing, however, to show that the House of Lords
does not always abide by the judges' opinion,19 and quite another to assert that references have no precedential effect on
187. ' To say that our opinion may bind no one is, I respectfully submit, not
a satisfactory disposition of the matter." Reference re References, 43 S.C.R.
536, 570 (1910) (Idington, J., dissenting), affl'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912). Justice Idington went on to explain that Parliament has the power to make reference
opinions binding by enacting the opinions as law. Id.
188. Rubin, supra note 98, at 180.
189. "Even before 1912 there were phrases uttered judicially and action
taken judicially which indicated that judicial practice was going to be quite different than that suggested by the words 'advisory only."' I& at 177.
190. 43 S.C.R. at 588.
191. 1929 S.C.R. 200.
192. Id. at 228.
193. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434, 451 (1910) (quotation omitted). Justice Duff said that "if the question should afterwards be brought
before them judicially," they should be prepared to change their opinion. Id.
194. The Privy Council most often treated reference opinions as binding.
For example, in Attorney Gen. for Man. v. Manitoba License Holder's Assoc.,
Lord MacNaghten repeatedly described the earlier Local Prohibition Reference, 1896 App.Cas. 348 (P.C.), opinion as a "decision" and as "the judgment of
this Board." 1902 App.Cas. 73, 77-78 (P.C.). The Reference re Representation
in the House of Commons described Supreme Court reference opinions as "decisions." 1905 App.Cas. 37, 43 (P.C.). See Rubin, supra note 98, at 177.
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lower courts or lesser governmental officials. In M'Naghten's
Case,195 Justice Manle accepted that reference opinions will be
"cited in criminal trials."'196 Similarly, in Reference re References, counsel argued that "[a]n opinion by the judges of the
Supreme Court of Canada is entirely different from an opinion
given by any other individuals, even if equally qualified, inasmuch as all provincial courts, while not, perhaps, legally bound
to give effect to that opinion, would feel themselves bound by
that opinion."''1
The Supreme Court itself has often relied on earlier reference opinions as precedent. Although as recently as 1957, in
CanadianPac. Ry. v. Town of Estevan,198 the Court stated that
reference opinions are not binding in future cases, the Court
rarely rejects reference opinions as relevant precedent. 19 9 Even
in Town of Estevan, after stating that reference opinions were
not binding, the Court agreed with the holding of a reference
that had been urged as precedent. 200
The stature of SUpreme Court references, therefore, is difficult to ignore. The precedential method of the common law,
moreover, increases the likelihood that courts will follow prior
reference decisions. In response to an objection that a Supreme
Court reference opinion on one province's legislation might
195. 10 Cl. & F. 200 (1843).
196. IMi at 204.
197. 43 S.C.R. at 544. Ample evidence suggests that Justice Idington was
correct. See, eg., Milk Board v. Hillside Farm Dairy Ltd., 40 D.L.R. 2d 731, 733
(B.C. 1963) (holding Reference re Farm Prods. Mktg. Act (Ont.), 1958 S.C.R.
31, binding); Legal Proceedings Suspension Act Reference, [1942] 3 D.L.R. 318
(Alta.) (quoting preamble to Act and stating that Reference re Debt Adjustment Act, 1935, 1942 S.C.L 31, was binding); The King v. Brinkley, 14 O.L.R.
434, 436-37 (1907) (holding Reference re Criminal Code Sections Relating to
Bigamy, 27 S.C.R. 461 (1897) binding). Justice Idington stated the argument
less subtly: "What right have we to attempt to overawe them [the provincial
courts] by dicta of ours, obtained by this method?" Reference re References,
43 S.C.R. at 572 (Idington, J., dissenting). In addition to believing provincial
courts would hesitate to ignore the Supreme Court's reference opinions, Justice Idington also feared the Court's repeated insistence that such opinions
were non-binding "would ... encourage a contempt for the highest court in
the Dominion." Id at 578.
198. 1957 S.C.R. 365.
199. In 1959 Gerald Rubin reported that "there is not one recorded instance since 1891, with the exception of the Kerley case, where opinions rendered on either federal or provincial references were repudiated in a
subsequent reference or concrete case." Rubin, supra note 98, at 180. In
Kerley v. London & Lake Erie Transp. Co., [1912] 6 D.L.R. 189 (Ont.), a provincial court declined to follow the Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905). Id. at 192, 194.
200. 1957 S.C.R. at 368-69.
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bind unrepresented provinces, Justice Idington agreed that
"[s]uch must of necessity under our system of jurisprudence,
resting upon precedent, be the result of any decision of any
concrete case." 20 1 In Reference re Wartime Leasehold Regulations, Chief Justice Rinfret reasserted that reference opinions
are non-binding, but then stated that "in a contested case
where the same questions would arise, they would no doubt be
2 02
followed."
F. A MANDATORY OR DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL FUNCTION
The conclusion that reference jurisdiction is constitutional
and appropriate did not resolve questions relative to the Court's
exercise of the function. Many policy arguments made against
the reference 20 3 also could be urged as reasons for the Court to
decline to render opinions in particular cases. Such an exercise
of judicial discretion would depend, of course, on the Court's
authority to abstain.
The most persistent critic of the reference, Justice Idington, did not urge that the Court had such discretion. Indeed,
he insisted that the Court is "bound to observe and discharge
'
such judicial functions as are implied [in section 101]."204
Other

members of the Court have seen some room for judicial maneuvering. Some have suggested a bit of judicial diplomacy, while
others have argued for a degree of judicial discretion. For example, Justice Davies believed the Court could urge the executive to withdraw or reformulate reference questions. 20 5 Other
justices believed the Court appropriately could abstain from
hearing certain references.2 °0
201. Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. at 568 (Idington, J., dissenting).
202. 1950 S.C.R. 124, 126.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 114-35.
204. Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. at 569-70 (Idington, J., dissenting).
205. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434 (1910). Justice Davies reluctantly rendered an opinion "in obedience to the imperative provisions of
the statute," but argued "that the better course would be for this court to refer
the questions back to His Excellency in Council," pointing out the problems
inherent in a judicial opinion under the circumstances. Id. at 437. Justice Anglin made the same point after stating that "the court answers the questions
now submitted with reluctance and diffidence, solely in obedience to the imperative provisions of the statute." Id. at 454; see also Attorney Gen. for Ont.
v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1912 App.Cas. 571, 589 (P.C.) (Can.) (stating that
the Court could point out in its answer its reservations, or could "make the
necessary representation to the Governor-General in Council" if it thought
such treatment of the question was appropriate."
206. 43 S.C.R. at 453-54. The Court had precedent for such a conclusion. In
the 1882 Reference re the Quebec Timber Co., Cout. Cas. 43 (1882), the Court
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In at least one case the Supreme Court declined to answer
several questions because the relevant facts were not before the
Court. Justice Duff insisted that when the "interrogatory is
are
general in form" and the "facts affecting [specific interests]
20 7
capable of ascertainment," it is inappropriate to answer.
Proponents and opponents of reference procedure have articulated plausible theories for their positions, based on constitutional and statutory law, common law conceptions about the
role of courts, policy concerns about the impact of judicial advice, and conceptions of the Canadian federal system. The next
section examines the history of Supreme Court references,
where practice has tested the competing theories.
declined to answer some questions because of an expected effect on private
rights. In Reference re References, decided the same year as Reference re
Criminal Code, Chief Justice Fitzpatrick, admitted "it is our duty to consider
the questions submitted," 43 S.C.R. at 547, but statedIf in the course of the argument or subsequently it becomes apparent
that to answer any particular question might interfere with the
proper administration of justice, it will then be time to ask the executive... not to insist upon answers being given .... notwithstanding
that such answers would not in any circumstances have the binding
force of adjudication, like decisions given in regular course of judicial
proceedings.
I& at 547.
Perhaps the Chief Justice's concern for the proper administration of justice reflected a recognition that reference opinions were in fact more than merely
advisory.
Chief Justice Fitzpatrick's argument may mean that, when exercising its
reference jurisdiction, the Court, like any legal advisor, should be free to urge
its advisee to pursue a different course of action than the one contemplated.
Under this view, the executive and the Court would consult about the appropriateness of a reference opinion in particular cases. In support of his position
the Chief Justice quoted Hargrave:
However numerous and strong the precedents may be in favour
of the King's extra-judicially consulting the judges on questions in
which the Crown is interested, it is a right to be understood with
many exceptions, and such as ought to be exercised with great reserve
lest the rigid impartiality so essential to their judicial capacity, should
be violated.
Id- at 551 (quotation omitted).
207. Reference re Water and Water-Powers, 1929 S.C.R. 200, 224. In support Justice Duff cited a Privy Council decision effectively holding that the
Supreme Court had gone too far in answering particular reference questions.
"[Tihe task imposed was ... an impossible one, owing to the abstract character
of the questions put." I&. at 228 (citing John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, 1915
App.Cas. 330, 339 (P.C.) (Can.).

CANADIAN ADVISORY OPINIONS

1990]

1287

III. REFERENCE JURISDICTION IN PRACTICE
A.

THE OPINIONS

The Supreme Court of Canada has answered approximately 115 references. 20 8 The first reference opinion, rendered
in 1874, concluded that the Dominion Parliament exceeded its
legislative authority in incorporating a teachers' society. 20 9 The
most recent reference opinion, rendered in 1989, upheld a Newfoundland workers' compensation law in the face of a challenge
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 210 Other
reference opinions have dealt with similar questions related to
Dominion and provincial legislative authority. Although the
Supreme Court has rendered mixed results in terms of relative
Dominion and provincial powers, neither side has been reluctant to turn to the Supreme Court for answers to the most basic questions of Canadian constitutional government.
Anyone familiar with the rapidly expanding caseload of
American courts might expect the reference caseload of the Canadian Supreme Court to have grown steadily over the last century. It has not. As Figure I illustrates, the number of
references has fluctuated. The number of references increased
significantly during the 1920s to a peak in the 1930s. It then declined steadily through the 1970s before rising sharply in the
1980s. 21 The most logical explanation for this pattern, particularly in light of the predominance of federalism issues in references, is that the provinces were especially concerned about the
threat of expanding Dominion power in the 1930s and 1980s. In
the 1930s the Dominion expanded economic regulations to
counter the effects of the Great Depression.2 1 In the 1980s
208. See Appendix.
209. Reference re The Bros. of the Christian Schools in Canada, Cout. Cas.,
Apr. 4 (1874) (concluding that Parliament did not have jurisdiction to incorporate a teachers' society because the power was solely within provincial

jurisdiction).
210. Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
211. Strayer, even in the 1983 edition of his book, predicts a continuing decline in reliance on references. "The second century of Confederation has so
far seen a sharply reduced rate of references in comparison to the volume of
ordinary constitutional litigation, and this trend is likely to continue." B.
STRAYER, supra note 6, at 295.
212. For example, in 1936 the following Parliamentary Acts were subjects
of references: The Dominion Trade and Indus. Comm. Act, 1935, ch. 59, 1935
CAN.STAT. 357 (Reference re Trade and Indus. Commission Act, 1935, 1936
S.C.R. 379; The Weekly Rest in Indus. Undertakings Act, 1935, ch. 14, 1935
CAN. STAT. 49, The Minimum Wages Act, 1935, ch. 44, 1935 CAN. STAT. 231,
and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 1935, ch. 63, 1935 CAN. STAT. 381,
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Figure I
SUPREME COURT REFERENCES BY DECADE
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* Note: All figures based on data in Appendix.

control over natural resources and amendment of the Constitu213
tion were the cause of provincial concern.
(Reference re Weekly Rest in Indus. Undertakings Act, Minimum Wages Act,
Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 1936 S.C.R. 461); The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, ch. 53, 1934 CAN. STAT. 1317, as amended by The Farmers' Creditors Act Amendment Act, 1935, ch. 20, 1935 CAN. STAT. 81,
(Reference re Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 384; The
Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934, ch. 57, 1934 CAN. STAT. 1335, as amended by
The Natural Prods. Mktg. Act Amendment Act, 1935, ch. 64, 1934 CAN. STAT.
387, (Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 398, The Employment and Social Ins. Act, 1935, ch. 38, 1935 CAN. STAT. 175, (Reference re
Employment and Social Insurance Act, 1935, 1936 S.C.R. 427. The Dominion
prevailed in two, lost in two, and got mixed results in the fifth case. See Appendix. All these reference were affirmed by the Privy Council. I&
213. See, e.g., Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 1004; Reference re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and
Related Areas, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 69; Reference re Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86; Reference re Upper
Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297; Reference re Constitution of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793; Reference re Resolutions to Amend
the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753; Reference re Senate, [1980] 1
S.C.R. 54 (per curiam).
On the general question of the provincial role in constitutional amendment, see Hogg & Lederman, Commentaries:Amendment and Patriation,19
ALBERTA L. REv. 369 (1981); Lederman, The Processof ConstitutionalAmend-
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Figure H
SUBJECT MATTER OF
SUPREME COURT REFERENCES
1874-1989

Dominion Legislative Power
Provincial Legislative Power

1 1118
9

I

Reference Jurisdiction

Dominion Versus Provincial Title to Land

Criminal Procedure

=5
=4
7

Interpretation of Dominion Law
Railroads

13

-

Individual and Charter Rights

Delegation by Parliament

Constitutional Amendment
3

Note -- In addition to the topics included above, the following subjects
were considered in one or two references as indicated: provincial
constitutional interpretation (2), interprovincial disputes (2),
international law (2), provincial versus Dominion liability for costs
(2), delegation by province (1), disallowance (1), interpretation of
provincial law (1), payment of fines (1), and the Chief Justice of
Alberta (1). Because some references have considered multiple
issues, the total of subjects considered exceeds the total number of
references.
* Note: All figures based on data in Appendix.

1290

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1251

As illustrated in Figure II, the vast majority of references
concern the distribution of power in the Canadian federal sys-

tem.2 1 4 Forty-two opinions have answered express questions

about the extent of Dominion legislative jurisdiction. Thirty
references have involved express questions about provincial
legislative authority. Nine references have concerned provincial versus Dominion title to lands. Three references in the
1980s have resolved fundamental questions about the role of
provinces in amendment of the Canadian Constitution. In addition, eighteen references have addressed questions about the
nature and extent of Supreme Court reference jurisdiction,
questions often reflecting provincial concern about Supreme
Court authority to determine the scope of provincial powers.
No other subject-matter category accounts for a significant
number of references, although a few opinions have addressed
important questions. Six references have involved criminal
procedure 21 5 Others have interpreted Dominion and provincial
laws,2 1 6 determined the rights and responsibilities of railment for Canada,12 MCGHL L.J. 371 (1966-67); Marshall, Beyond the B.NA.
Act: Amendment and Patriation,19 ALBERTA L. REXv. 363 (1981). On the general question of provincial versus Dominion control of natural resources, see
MANAGING NATURAL REsouRcEs IN A FEDERAL STATE (J. Saunders, ed. 1986).

214. Eighty-nine of the 115 reference opinions deal with questions relevant
to the division of powers between the provincial and Dominion governments.
An asterisk indicates these cases in the Appendix. This predominance of federalism issues - 76% - would be even greater if all cases involving the definition of Dominion or provincial power were included. Included in the total of
89 are those in which a provincial government expressly disagreed with the
Dominion government or in which the definition of the power of one government would directly affect the power of the other government. At least ten
other references have indirectly affected the distribution of governmental
powers, in the sense that the denial or recognition of power in one government
may indicate whether that the other government has such power. For example, three references dealt with the extent to which Parliament delegated
power to executive officials of the Dominion government. Reference re Persons of Japanese Race, 1946 S.C.R. 248, affd, 1947 App.Cas. 87; Reference re
Regulations Under the War Measures Act, 1943 S.C.R. 1; Reference re Tariff
Board of Commerce, 1934 S.C.R. 538. Unless the power in question is exclusive with the Dominion government, or because it is exclusive with the provincial governments, the reference opinion will affect the distribution of powers
between the provincial and Dominion governments. Thus, the percentage of
references dealing with federalism is arguably as high as 84%.
215. Reference re Criminal Code, 43 S.C.R. 434 (1910); Reference re Deportation and Immigration Act, 1933 S.C.R. 269; Reference re Regina v. Coffin,
1956 S.C.R. 186; Reference re Regina v. Coffin, 1956 S.C.R. 191; Reference re
Regina v. Truscott, 1967 S.C.R. 309; Reference re The Judicature Act, [1984] 2
S.C.R. 697.
216. See, ag., Reference re The Jury Act of Alberta, 1922, 1947 S.C.R. 213;
Reference re § 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968, 1970 S.C.R. 777.
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interpreted provincial constitutional provisions,21

1291
and

interpreted international law.21 9 Only three references have involved express questions of individual rights,2 0 but that
number should increase with the recent adoption of the Char221
ter of Rights.

B. WHO REFERS QUESTIONS TO THE SUPREME COURT?
1. The Governor General
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's statutory reference jurisdiction, the Governor General has submitted most reference
questions. 222 The Governor General, however, seldom requests
a reference independently, but acts at the government's behest.2ca The submission by the Governor General is one of
form, not substance. The government is not always the true
party in interest when the Governor General refers a question
to the Supreme Court. The government must approve every
reference, but it may do so at the request of other parties.
Because of the often informal and extra-constitutional nature of Dominion-provincial relations, many references result
from agreement between the Dominion and one or several
provinces to refer a particular issue to the Supreme Court. For
217. See, eg., Reference re Canadian Pac. Ry. Act, 36 S.C.R. 41 (1905); Reference re Grand Trunk Ry., 42 S.C.R. 505 (1909).
218. See, e.g., Reference re Manitoba Education Act, 22 S.C.R. 577 (1893),
rev'd, 11 Times L. Rev. 198.
219. See, e.g., Reference re United States Military or Naval Forces, 1943
S.C.R. 483.
220. Reference re An Act to Amend the Education Act, Ontario [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1148; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Alberta,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 313; Reference re Meaning of "Persons", 1928 S.C.R. 276.
221. The Charter of Rights, adopted in 1982, is the first written constitutional protection of liberties in Canada. Although it is early in the charter's
history, "it seems apparent ... that the Charter is receiving a more generous
reception [than the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights] by the judiciary." Black, The
Charterof Rights and Freedoms-Introduction,in 2 CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA 859 (1985).
222. The Dominion Senate submitted three of the first four references pursuant to The Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875, ch. 11, § 53, 1875 CAN.
STAT. 67, 78. Since then, the Governor General has submitted all but four of
the questions referred by the Dominion government.
223. The only body which can direct a reference to the Court is the
"Governor General in Council." This phrase means Canada's Governor General and Privy Council, which stand at the formal apex of
Canada's federal government; in practice, these bodies are only ceremonial; executive power is wielded by the Prime Minister and his cabinet - the government of the day.
Hogg, Jurisdictionof the Court- The Supreme Court of Canada, 3 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 39, 51 (1980).
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example, questions relative to the Dominion's authority over
aerial navigation were referred after agreement among participants at a Dominion-provincial conference.224 The 1931 Reference re Natural Resources225 involved questions in connection
with negotiations between the Government of Canada and the
Province of Saskatchewan. 226 The Governor General submits
numerous references on behalf of provinces, although presumably the government will not be happy with an opinion that Dominion legislation is ultra vires the BNA Act.2
These
submissions likely reflect Dominion political strategy: rather
than allowing the provinces to resist Dominion legislation, the
Dominion prefers to have its court resolve the issue.
The Governor General submits some references on behalf
of private parties. The Order in Council referring questions in
Reference re Persons of the Japanese Race228 stated that "the
Acting Minister of Justice reports that representations have
been made to him, by and on behalf of a number of Canadian
organizations and societies . .. requesting a reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada." 229 In Reference re TariffBoard of
Commerce,230 the Governor General submitted questions in
part as a response to "an appeal ... by a Canadian manufac1
turer."233
Foreign governments also have influenced the Gov232
ernor General to seek reference opinions.
224. Reference re Aeronautics, 1930 S.C.R. 663, 668, rev'd, 1932 App.Cas. 54.

225. 1931 S.C.R. 263.
226. I& at 264.
227. For example, five references submitted in 1936 questioned the validity
of the Dominion government's legislative response to the Great Depression.

See supra note 212. The Governor General submitted all five, but not because
the government doubted the validity of the various acts. The provinces cannot
refer questions to the Supreme Court, see supra notes 27-31, so they must ask
the Governor General to act on their behalf, or must seek a provincial court
opinion and then appeal to the Supreme Court if they dispute the result.

228. 1946 S.C.&. 248.
229. Id. at 253.
230. 1934 S.C.R. 538.
231. Id at 540. Justice Rinfret reported that "[t]he Governor in Council
considered these matters were of great public importance and thought, pending any decision of the matter, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada

should be obtained." Id
232. In one reference, for example, the Governor General submitted a ref-

erence at the request of the Minister of Justice after receiving a letter from
the Consul General of Japan urging "exercise [of] the power of disallowance
with regard to a statute of British Columbia." Reference re Employment of
Aliens, [1921] 63 S.C.R. 293, 294, aij'd,20 Oct. 1923.
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Appeals from Provincial High Courts

The second most common source of reference questions is
appeals from provincial high courts. Twenty-three references
have been appeals from provincial reference opinions.2 The
Governor General submitted twelve other references in response to provincial court decisions.
Although appeals from
provincial references represent less than a quarter of all refer233. Reference re Que. Education System, 1926 S.C.R. 246, affd, 1928
App.Cas. 200; Reference re Exchequer Court Jurisdiction, 1926 S.C.R. 239; Reference re Provincial Treasurer of N. S., 1937 S.C.R. 403; Reference re the Jury
Act of Alta., 1922, 1947 S.C.R. 213; Reference re Hours of Work Act, 1936, 1948
S.C.R. 373, aff'd, 1950 App.Cas. 122; Reference re Esquinalt & Nanaimo Ry Co.
Land Grant, 1948 S.C.R. 403; Reference re Regina v. Snider, 1954 S.C.R. 479;
Reference re Vehicles Act, 1958 S.C.R. 608; Reference re The Real Property
Act, R.S.M., 1958 S.C.R. 285; Reference re The Municipal Act, 1958 S.C.R. 744;
Reference re Orderly Payment of Debts Act, Alta. 1959, 1960 S.C.R. 571; Reference re The Provincial Jurisdiction of the Court Act, 1965 S.C.R. 772; Reference re Agricultural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1970, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198; Reference re
Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753; Reference re
the Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714; Reference re the Family
Relations Act, S.B.C. 1978, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 62; Reference re Natural Gas and
Natural Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1004; Reference re Constitution of
Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793; Reference re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of
Georgia, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 388; Reference re the Judicature Act, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
697; Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R.
297; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Alta. 1980, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 313; Reference re An Act to Amend the Education Act, Ont, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1148.
This total does not include an unusual case reported only in the British
Columbia Law Reports, Sewell v. British Columbia Towing Co., 1 B.C.R. 153
(1882) (The Thrasher Case). Apparently, the issue in the case was submitted
to the Canadian Supreme Court as a reference. Id at 243 (note). The Supreme
Court's opinion is included as a note at the end of the provincial court's opinion and is treated as authority for that opinion. I& at 243-44 (note).
234. Reference re Criminal Code - Bigamy, 27 S.C.R. 461 (1897); Reference re Fisheries Act, 1928 S.C.R. 457, caff'd, 1930 App.Cas. 111; Reference re
§ 110 Dominion Act, 1927, 1934 S.C.R. 653; Reference re Canada Temperance
Act, 1927, 1935 S.C.R. 494; Reference re Jurisdiction of Cty. and Dist. Cts., 1938
S.C.R. 398; Reference re Regulations under the War Measures Act, 1943 S.C.R.
1; Reference re the Minimum Wage Act, 1948 S.C.R. 248; Reference re Regina
v. Coffin, 1956 S.C.R. 191; Reference re Regina v. Truscott, 1967 S.C.R. 309;
Reference re § 16 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968, 1970 S.C.R. 777; Reference re Appeal on Application to Intervene, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 791; Reference re
Seabed and Subsoil Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86. Some of these
provincial decisions were pursuant to the provincial court's reference authority. In these cases, the Governor General submitted an independent reference
raising the same question. Provincial court decisions in contested cases motivated other references. Most interesting among those cases are two in which
the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the provincial decision, but
then agreed to answer a reference posing the same questions in hypothetical
language. See Reference re Truscott, 1967 S.C.R. 309, 309; Reference re Regina
v. Coffin, 1956 S.C.R. 191, 191-92.
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ence proceedings, they have increased markedly since 1940.
Nearly half of the references since 1940, and more than half
since 1970, have come by appeal from provincial courts. 2- This
trend is partly attributable to the 1922 amendment of the
Supreme Court Act allowing appeals from provincial courts, 2-3
but continued growth in the proportion of such appeals suggests other factors are at work. Although theoretically some
questions can be raised in a Supreme Court reference only on
appeal, 2 37 the subject matter of the references does not correlate with whether the Court hears the reference on the Governor General's submission or on appeal from a provincial
235. Twenty-three of 115 references have come by appeal from provincial
references. Since 1940, 22 of 51 references have been by appeal from a provincial reference. Since 1970, 12 of 21 references have been appeals. See
Appendix.
236. An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, 1922, ch. 48, 1922 CAN.
STAT. 189.
237. The Supreme Court Act enumerates the subject matter of references,
CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 5-26, § 53(1) (1985), but paragraph (2) opens the flood
gates to Governor General discretion. Id § 53(2) (stating that the Governor in
Council may refer to the Court any important question as the Governor sees
fit).
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court.
Whatever the reasons, many questions the Governor
General could submit are now first raised in provincial high
courts. The provinces probably prefer this situation because
they have more control in framing the issues, they limit Dominion and Supreme Court discretion by coming to the Court
on appeal, and they may be more likely to get a favorable decision in the provincial court. 23 9 Figure IHI illustrates the growth
in appeals as a percentage of the total number of references.
3. Statutory Appeals
Occasionally references result from statutorily authorized
appeals from decisions of other governmental entities or
processes. In Reference re ManitobaEducation Statutes,24° the
Catholic minority appealed to the Governor General under Section 22(2) of the Manitoba Act, 1 questioning the provincial
legislature's curtailment of a tax immunity for Roman
Catholics who send their children to church schools.=
Although the Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal on the
facts submitted, the Court made clear that in some cases Section 22(2) would authorize appeal.2 3 Two other references
were appeals from arbiters' decisions in Dominion-provincial
disputes in which the statute authorizing the arbitration ex2
pressly provided for such appeal to the Governor General. "
238. Since 1980, appeals from provincial references have involved questions
of provincial legislative authority, Dominion legislative authority, provincial
versus Dominion title to land, provincial rights in constitutional amendment,
intervention in reference proceedings, and judicial authorization of wiretaps.
See Appendix.
239. Although the Supreme Court is free to overturn the provincial court
opinion, comity seems to work in favor of affirmance.
240. 22 S.C.R. 577 (1894).
241. Manitoba Act, ch. 3, § 22(2), 1870 CAN. STAT. 20.
242. 22 S.C.R. at 652.
243. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he proper answers to be given to
the questions propounded depend principally on the meaning to be attached to
the words 'any right or privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic minority
of the Queen's subjects in relation to education' in subsection 2 of section 22 of
the Manitoba Act." I& at 652. The Court concluded that the relevant rights
and privileges were those existing at the time of confederation. I& at 661.
244. Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 31 S.C.R. 516 (1901),
rev'd, 1903 App.Cas. 39; Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 28
S.C.R. 609 (1898). Both references involved questions of the rights of Ontario
and Quebec versus the Dominion with respect to school trust lands. The appeals were pursuant to similar legislation the Dominion Parliament and the
two provinces had adopted. The Dominion version provided that "[a]ny award
made under this Act shall be ... subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada." Act of July 10, 1891, ch. 6, 1891 CAN. STAT. 82, 83. See Act of May 4,
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C. APPEALS TO THE PRIVY CouNciL
References also were appealed to the English Privy Council before the abolition of all such appeals in 1949. 245 Between
1889 and 1949, thirty-nine of seventy-six Supreme Court references were appealed.m Of this number, one was withdrawn, 7
three were denied,2 five were reversed,24 9 and the remainder
were affirmed.2 The Privy Council apparently was chary of
interfering in Canadian federal politics, but nevertheless reversed the Supreme Court in some important cases. In two
cases the Privy Council overruled the Supreme Court on questions of Dominion versus provincial legislative competence.S 1
The Privy Council also reversed the Supreme Court's decision
that women were ineligible for membership in the Canadian
Senate.252 The Privy Council's affirmance of Supreme Court
reference opinions has been important, particularly its agreement with the constitutionality of the reference process
3
itself.2
1891, ch. 2, 1891 ONT. STAT. 6, 7; Act of Dec. 30, 1890, ch. 4, 1890 QUE. STAT. 31,
32.
245. See supra note 69.
246. See Appendix.
247. Reference re Disallowance Power of the Governor General, 1938
S.C.R. 71.
248. Reference re § 16 of the Special War Revenue Act, 1932, 1942 S.C.R.
429; Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905); Reference re The Jesuits' Estates Act, 12 LEGAL NEws 283 (1889).
249. Reference re Manitoba Education Act, 22 S.C.R. 577 (1894), rev'd 11
TIMES L. REV. 198; Reference re Prohibitory Liquor Laws, 24 S.C.R. 170 (1895),
rev'd sub n Attorney Gen. Ont. v. Attorney Gen. Can., 1896 App.Cas. 348,
371 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 31 S.C.R. 516
(1901), rev'd sub nom Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1903,
App.Cas. 39, 48 (P.C.)(Can.); Reference re Meaning of "Persons," 1928 S.C.R.
276, rev'd sub nom Edwards v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1930, App.Cas. 124, 143
(P.C.)(Can.); Reference re Aerial Navigation, 1930 S.C.R. 663, rev'd 1932
App.Cas. 54,78 (P.C.)(Can.).
250. See Appendix.
251. Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1896 App.Cas. at
371, revtg Reference re Prohibitory Liquor Laws, 24 S.C.R. 170 (1894); Reference re The Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, 1932 App.Cas.
at 78, revjg Reference re Aerial Navigation, 1930 S.C.R. 663.
252. Edwards, 1930 App.Cas. at 143, revg Reference re Meaning of "Persons," 1928 S.C.R. 276.
253. Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Cen. for Can., 1912 App.Cas. 571,
589 (P.C.)(Can.), ff'g Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910).
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IV. THE ROLE OF REFERENCES IN DEFINING THE
CANADIAN FEDERATION
Given the predominance of federalism issues in reference
cases, the reference procedure has played an important role in
the constitutional definition of the Canadian federal system.
The provinces were concerned from the beginning that the
Supreme Court's reference jurisdiction would threaten their
sovereignty. 2- Assurances that reference opinions would not
be binding did not quell provincial concerns. After failing to
persuade the Court that the reference proceeding violated their
constitutionally guaranteed sovereigntyj2 the provinces tried
to circumvent the Court by establishing their own reference
procedures and bypassing the Supreme Court with direct appeals to the Privy Council.2
Although some argue that the reference may limit Dominion power,25 7 the general assumption has been that the
Supreme Court favors the Dominion over the provinces. The
Dominion executive appoints members of the Court,
and
"[t]he provinces have no role in the selection of judges, and are
not in practice consulted before an appointment is made." 2-59
Although a statute requires that three of the Court's nine
members be from Quebec, 26° and by custom the Dominion executive appoints three members of the Court from Ontario, two
from the four western provinces, and one from the four Atlantic provinces, that tradition was broken in 1978.261 Even with
mandatory and customary provincial representation, however,
the Court nonetheless is a part of the Dominion government
and thus a possible threat to the provinces.
The following three sections evaluate the impact of
254. See supranotes 76-97 and accompanying text.
255. Id.
256. As indicated supra note 69, all appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1949.

257. See Clokie, JudicialReview, Federalism and the Canadian Constitution, 8 CAN. J. OF ECON. & POL. SCI. 537, 543, 554 (1942); Jennings, Constitutional Interpretation: The Experience of Canada, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1, 12
(1937).
258. Supreme Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. S-19, § 4(2) (1985).
259. Hogg, supra note 223, at 40.
260. Supreme Court Act, CAN. RzV. STAT. ch. S-26, § 16 (1985). Hogg asserts the purpose of this provision is to ensure that at least three members of
the Court are versed in the civil law. Hogg, supra note 223, at 39. Although
this is a justifiable rationale for Quebec's special treatment, political power
certainly made the provision possible.
261. In 1978, Judge Spence from Ontario retired and was replaced by Judge
McIntyre from British Columbia. See Hogg, supra note 223, at 39.
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Supreme Court reference opinions on provincial sovereignty
and the distribution of power in the Canadian federation. The
Article considers three categories of references: those interpreting Dominion power under Section 91 of the BNA Act,
those interpreting provincial power under Section 92 of the
BNA Act, and those involving questions of control over land
and natural resources. Although the raw numbers suggest the
provinces have lost more than their share, it is not clear
whether the Supreme Court has sided with the Dominion in its
political struggle with the provinces.

A. DOMINION POWER UNDER SECTION 91 OF THE BNA ACT
Forty-two references have raised questions of the Dominion's legislative jurisdiction under Section 91 of the BNA
Act. 262 In twenty-seven of these references the Supreme Court
concluded that existing or proposed legislation was intra
vires. 263 In eight the Court found the legislation ultra vires,264
262. See Appendix.
263. Reference re N.B. Penitentiary, Cout. Cas. 24 (1880); Reference re The
Que. Timber Co., Cout. Cas. 43 (1882); Reference re Canada Provident Association, Cout. Cas. 48 (1882); Reference re Criminal Code - Bigamy, 27 S.C.R.
461, 461 (1897); Reference re Ry. Act Amendment, 36 S.C.R. 136, 136 (1905),
affd, 48 Can.Gaz. 159; Reference re Intl & Interprovincial Ferries, 36 S.C.R.
206, 206 (1905); Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536, 536 (1910), aff'd, 1912
App.Cas. 571; Reference re Bd. of Commerce, 60 S.C.R. 456, 457 (1920), qf'd,
[1922] 1 App.Cas. 191; Reference re Exchequer Ct. Jurisdiction, S.C.R. 239
(1926); Reference re § 189 of the Ry. Act, 1926 S.C.R. 163, 163, qf'd, 1926
App.Cas. 715; Reference re Combines Investigation Act, 1929 S.C.R. 409, 409;
Reference re Radio Communication, 1931 S.C.R. 541, 541; Reference re § 110 of
the Dominion Cos. Act, 1934 S.C.R. 659, 659; Reference re § 498A of the Criminal Code, 1936 S.C.R. 363, 363, affd, 1937 App.Cas. 368; Reference re Farmers
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 384, 384, affd, 1937 App.Cas.
391; References re the Weekly Rest in Indus. Undertakings Act, 1936 S.C.R.
461, 462, affd, 1937 App. Cas. 326; Reference re The Term "Indians," 1939
S.C.R. 104; Reference re An Act to Amend the Supreme Ct. Act, 1940 S.C.R.
49, 50, qf'd, 1943 App.Cas. 127; Reference re U.S. Military or Naval Forces,
1943 S.C.R. 483, 484; Reference re the Wartime Leasehold Regulations, 1950
S.C.R. 124, 125; Reference re Bowater's Newfoundland Pulp & Paper Mills,
Ltd., 1950 S.C.R. 608, 624; Reference re the Indus. Relations & Disputes Investigation Act, 1955 S.C.R. 529, 529; Reference re the Real Property Act, 1958
S.C.R. 285, 285-86; Reference re the Mun. Act, 1958 S.C.R. 744, 745; Reference
re Anti-Inflation Act, 2 [1976] S.C.R. 373, 374.
264. Reference re The Bros. of the Christian Schools in Can., Cout. Cas.,
Apr. 4 (1874); Reference re Marriage Act, 46 S.C.R. 132, 133 (1912), qff'd, 1912
App.Cas. 880; Reference re Ins. Act, 1910, 48 S.C.R. 260, 260 (1913); Reference
re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1928 S.C.R. 457, 458, aff'd, 1930 App.Cas. 111; Reference
re The Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 398, qff'd, 1937 App.Cas.
377; Reference re Employment & Social Ins. Act, 1936 S.C.R. 427, 427, a'ffd,
1937 App.Cas. 355; Reference re § 16 of the Special War Revenue Act, 1942
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and in five the Court concluded the legislation was both intra
and ultra vires. 265 The Court refused to answer the question

posed in one reference. 2 66 Sixteen of these opinions were appealed to the English Privy Council. The Privy Council, showing no Dominion or provincial bias, affirmed the Supreme
Court opinion in twelve cases,2 7 reversed in one,268 reversed in
part in another 2 69 and refused to hear one appeal. 270 The two
reversals were of Supreme Court opinions that found Dominion
legislation both intra and ultra vires.
Until 1958, the Dominion government submitted all references that raised questions about the validity of Dominion legislation.271 Although provincial references may address
S.C.R. 429, 430; Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R.
1004, 1005.
265. Reference re Hours of Labour, 1925 S.C.R. 505, 505; Reference re Aerial Navigation, 1930 S.C.R. 663, 663, rev'd, 1932 App.Cas. 54; Reference re
Trade and Indus. Comm. Act, 1935, 1936 S.C.R. 379, 379; Reference re § 5(a) of
the Daily Indus. Act, 1949 S.C.R. 1, 1, qffd. 1951 App.Cas. 179; Reference re
The Agricultural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1970, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 1199.
266. Reference re Can. Temperance Act, Cout. Cas. 204 (1907).
267. Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536 (1910), qff'd App.Cas. 571
(1912); Reference re Marriage Act, 46 S.C.R. 132 (1912), aff'd, 1912 App.Cas.
880; Reference re Bd. of Commerce, 60 S.C.R. 456 (1920), afjd, [1922] 1
App.Cas. 191; Reference re § 189 of the Ry. Act, 1926 S.C.R. 163, ff'd, 1926
App.Cas. 715; Reference re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1928 S.C.R. 457, qff'd, 1930
App.Cas. 111; Reference re § 498A of the Criminal Code, 1936 S.C.R. 363, qff'd,
1937 App.Cas. 368; Reference re Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934,
1936 S.C.R. 384, aff'd, 1937 App.Cas. 391; Reference re Weekly Rest in Indus.
Undertakings Act, Minimum Wage Act, Limitation of Hours of Work Act,
1936 S.C.R. 461, aff'd, 1937 App.Cas. 326; Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg.
Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 398, aff'd, 1937 App.Cas. 377; Reference re Employment
& Social Ins. Act, 1936 S.C.R. 427, affd, 1937 App.Cas. 355; Reference re An
Act to Amend the Supreme Ct. Act, 1940 S.C.R. 49, affd, 1943 App.Cas. 127;
Reference re § 5 of the Daily Indus. Act, 1949 S.C.R. 1, qff'd, 1951 App.Cas.
179.
268. Reference re Aerial Navigation, 1930 S.C.R. 663, rev'd, 1932 App.Cas.
54.
269. Reference re Trade and Indus. Comm. Act, 1935, 1936 S.C.R. 379, rev'd
in par affd in part,1937 App.Cas. 405.
270. Reference re § 16 of the Special War Revenue Act, 1932, 1942 S.C.R.
429.
271. The Board of Commerce submitted one of these cases, Reference re
Bd. of Commerce, 60 S.C.R. 456 (1920), qff'd, [1922] 1 App.Cas. 191, pursuant to
The Board of Commerce Act, ch. 37, § 32, 1919 CAN. STAT. 231, 238. The Senate submitted three under the provisions of The Supreme and Exchequer
Courts Act, ch. 11, § 32, 1919 CAN. STAT. 231, 238. (Reference re The Bros. of
the Christian Schools in Can., Cout. Cas., Apr. 4 (1874); Reference re Que.
Timber Co., Cout. Cas. 43 (1882); Reference re Can. Provident Ass'n, Cout.
Cas. 48 (1882)). The Governor General submitted the remainder pursuant to
The Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. ch. 35 (1927).

1300

0MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 74:1251

questions of Dominion law,27 2 and provincial reference opinions
have been appealable to the Supreme Court since 1922, 273 not
until 1958 did an appeal from a provincial reference question
the validity of Dominion legislation. 27 4 Since 1958, four of the
five references addressing Parliament's Section 91 powers have
come to the Court on appeal from provincial references. 27 5
Although the number of cases is small, the twenty-year period during which appeals from provincial reference opinions
have been the dominant avenue of challenge to Dominion legislation may suggest a shift from the traditional approach of persuading the Dominion government to have the Governor
General submit such questions. The provinces have good reasons to prefer initial submission of questions under Section 91
to their own courts. They can forego the politics inherent in
getting the Governor General to submit, give their court first
opportunity to address the question, and guarantee a Supreme
Court hearing should they be dissatisfied with the provincial
276
court's opinion.
The reference opinions on Dominion legislative authority
have played an important, but not a distinctive, role in the definition of Canadian federalism. Of the eight cases finding Dominion legislation ultra vires, three concerned control of
272. "Each provincial law is broadly framed, allowing the constitutionality
of federal laws as well as provincial laws to be referred, as well as nonconstitutional questions." Hogg, supra note 223, at 51.
273. An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, ch. 48, 1922 CAN. STAT. 189.
274. Reference re The Real Property Act, 1958 S.C.R. 285. Three pre-1958
references, although not appeals from provincial references, were motivated
by non-reference, provincial decisions: In one decision the Supreme Court
found intra vires a Dominion statute that the Ontario high court had held ultra vires. Reference re Criminal Code - Bigamy, 27 S.C.R. 461, 482 (1897)
rev'g, Regina v. Plowman, 25 O.R. 656 (1895). In Reference re Fisheries Act,
1914, 1928 S.C.R. 457, the Supreme Court found ultra vires a Dominion statute
that a British Columbia Magistrate also had found ultra vires. Id. (citation
omitted). In Reference re § 110 of the Dominion Companies Act, 1934 S.C.R.
653, the Supreme Court found intra vires a Dominion statute the Ontario
Court of Appeals had found ultra vires in Meyer Malt & Grain Co. v. Coombs,
1933 O.R. 259. Although the Ontario decision was settled after an appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Dominion chose to raise the question on a reference.
1934 S.C.R. at 654.
275. Reference re the Real Property Act, 1958 S.C.R. 285; Reference re the
Mun. Act, 1958 S.C.R. 744; Reference re Agricultural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1970,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198; Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 1004.
276. Hogg adds, "[The] right to appeal without leave means in effect that
the provincial governments enjoy the same privilege as the federal government in being able to secure a ruling from the Supreme Court of Canada on a
controverted point." Hogg, supra note 223, at 51.
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natural resources, 277 two concerned insurance industry regulation,278 and the others related to marriage, 279 trade and compe282
tition,280 social security, 281 and the power of incorporation.
Nothing suggests the reference procedure was peculiarly appropriate to these subjects, nor that use of the reference particularly influenced the outcome. Discussions of Dominion power
under Section 91 treat reference opinions as part of the interpretive case law, but not as a part having either greater or
2 3
lesser importance than non-reference opinions. 8
The only basis for claiming that references have peculiarly
influenced the evolution of Canadian federalism is that seventy-five percent of the Supreme Court decisions on the validity of Dominion legislation have favored the Dominion.284 It is
impossible to determine whether this Dominion advantage results from the Supreme Court viewing itself as the Dominion's
court, and this study has not developed the data necessary to
determine if the advantage to the Dominion is similar in nonreference opinions on the same subject.
Significantly, however, provinces continue to bring federalism issues to the Court,
and, as noted above, the Court has decided against the Dominion on occasion. The references in which the Supreme Court
has invalidated Dominion legislation have spanned the history
of the Court's reference jurisdiction, and in the period of great277. Reference re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1928 S.C.R. 457, affd, 1930 App.Cas.
111; Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 398, affd, 1937
App.Cas. 377; Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R.

1004.
278. Reference re Ins. Act, 1910, 48 S.C.R. 260 (1912); Reference re § 16 of
the Special War Revenue Act, 1932, 1942 S.C.R. 429.
279. Reference re Marriage Act, 46 S.C.R. 132 (1912), affd, 1912 App.Cas.

880.
280. Reference re Trade & Indus. Comm. Act, 1935, 1936 S.C.R. 379, rev'd
in par4 qffd in part,1937 App.Cas. 405.
281. Reference re Employment & Social Ins. Act, 1935, 1936 S.C.R. 427,

affd, 1937 App.Cas. 355.
282. Reference re The Bros. of the Christian Schools in Can., Cout. Cas.,
Apr. 4 (1874).
283. That references generally receive the same consideration as other
Supreme Court decisions is discussed supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
284. This figure is based on the 36 references in which the Court concluded

that Dominion legislation was either ultra or intra vires. See supra notes 26364. In five references the Court found Dominion legislation to be both ultra

and intra vires. See supra note 265.
285. Strayer's statistics on the frequency with which the Supreme Court
finds both Dominion and provincial legislation invalid indicate no significant
difference between references and ordinary cases. B. STRAYEP, supra note 6,

at 284.
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est Dominion ambition, the mid-1930s, the Supreme Court
objected to 6 as much Dominion legislation as it found
28
acceptable.
B. PROVINCIAL POWER UNDER SECTION 92 OF THE BNA ACT
The Dominion has enjoyed less advantage in references
challenging the validity of provincial legislation under Section
92 of the BNA Act. The Court has found provincial legislation
ultra vires fourteen times 287 and intra vires twelve times.2 s8 In
three references the Court found provincial law both ultra and
intra vires. 2s 9 References on provincial laws span the Court's
286. Judicial treatment of economic legislation of the 1930s, like United
States Supreme Court reaction to the early New Deal legislation, led some to
fear that the reference system disadvantaged the Dominion. See Davison, The
Constitutionalityand Utility of Advisory Opinions, 2 U. TORONTO L.J. 254,
270-75 (1937-38). Davison's objectivity is suspect, however, given his clear belief in the wisdom of the "new deal" program in both the United States and
Canada. I&! Of Justice Cardozo's role in the American law, he writes: "Mr.
Justice Cardozo, coming from a fine liberal tradition. . ., associated himself
with the liberal group of the supreme court of the United States, happily
enough in results, although in some opinions it is not clear that he understands the full economic significance of many modern problems." Id. at 274-75.
287. Reference re Prohibitory Liquor Laws, 24 S.C.R. 170, 170 (1895), rev'd
sub no. Attorney Cen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen.for Can., 1896 App.Cas. 345;
Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour, 35 S.C.R. 581, 592 (1905); Reference re B.C. Fisheries, 47 S.C.R. 493, 493 (1913), qff'd, 1914 App.Cas. 153; Reference re Alta. Ry. Act, 48 S.C.R. 9, 9 (1913), qff'd, 1915 App.Cas. 363;
Reference re Employment of Aliens, 63 S.C.R. 293, 293 (1921), qff'd, 20 Oct.
1923; Reference re Man. Act, 1924 S.C.R. 317, 317, qffd, 26 Mar. 1925; Reference re Alta. Statutes, 1937, 1938 S.C.R. 100, 100-01, affd, 1939 App.Cas. 117;
Reference re The Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, 1942 S.C.R. 31, 41, qff'd, 1943
App.Cas. 356; Reference re The Sask. Farm Security Act, 1944,1947 S.C.R. 394,
395; Reference re Esquinalt & Nanaimo Ry. Co., 1948 S.C.R. 403, 404; Reference re The Orderly Payment of Debts Act, Alta., 1959, 1960 S.C.R& 571, 571;
Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, [1981] S.C.R. 714, 714; Reference re
Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, 335; Reference re Man. Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 767.
288. Reference re The Thrasher Case, 1 B.C.R. 153, 243-44 (1882); Reference re Administration of Justice, 21 S.C.R. 446, 454 (1892); Reference re Quebec Education System, 1926 S.C.R. 246, qff'd, 1928 App.Cas.200; Reference re
§ 17 of the Alta. Act., 1927 S.C.R. 365, 374, qff'd, 1958 App.Cas. 594; Home Oil
Distributors Ltd. v. Attorney Gen.for B.C., 1940 S.C.R. 444, 444; Reference re
Municipal Dist. Act, 1941, 1943 S.C.R. 295, 295; Reference re Hours of Work
Act, 1948 S.C.R. 373, 380, affd, 1950 App.Cas. 122; Reference re The Farm
Prods. MIktg. Act, 1950, 1957 S.C.R. 198, 198-200; Reference re Sask. Vehicles
Act, 1957, 1958 S.C.R. 608, 608-09; Reference re Jurisdiction of the Magistrate's
Court Act, 1965 S.C.R. 772, 783; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Alta. 1980, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 314; Reference re An Act to Amend
the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 1151.
289. Reference re Incorporation of Companies, 48 S.C.R. 331, 332 (1913);
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history with a seemingly random distribution of ultra vires and
intra vires holdings. 290 Again the significance of the numbers is
probably that the Supreme Court does uphold provincial laws,
even though consequently curtailing the scope of Dominion legislative authority. 911 If the Supreme Court were inappropriately loyal to the Dominion government or somehow obliged to
that government, it likely would not defer to provincial claims
with such regularity.
Before abolition of English Privy Council appeals, approximately sixty percent of Supreme Court references on provincial
legislation were appealed. 292 As with appeals of references on
Dominion legislation,293 the Privy Council almost always deferred to the Supreme Court opinion. In only one of twelve appeals did the Privy Council reverse the Supreme Court. In the
1894 Reference re Prohibitory Liquor Laws,29 the Supreme
Court found Ontario's Act to Improve the Liquor License Acts
ultra vires, 295 and the Privy Council disagreed.
Because this
reference was the first concerning provincial legislation to be
appealed, the provinces may have believed the Privy Council
would be their salvation from Supreme Court invalidations of
provincial laws. Every ultra vires ruling on provincial legislaReference re Waters and Water-Power, 1929 S.C.R. 200, 201-03; Reference re
the Family Relations Act, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 62, 113-14.
290. The earliest reference questioning the validity of a provincial law was
Reference re The Thrasher Case, B.C.R. 153 (1882). The most recent were the
two 1987 references under the Charter, Reference re Public Service Employee
Relations Act, Alberta, 1980, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, and Reference re An Act to
Amend the Education Act, (Ont.), 1987 S.C.R. 1148. The distribution of ultra
vires and intra vires holdings in the intervening years appears to be random.
See Appendix.
291. This conclusion derives from the principle of exclusiveness on which
interpretation of BNA § 91-92 is based.
Each list of classes of subjects in s. 91 or s. 92 of the Constitution Act,
1867 is exclusive to the Parliament or Legislature to which it is assigned. This means that a particular "matter" will come within a
class of subjects in only one list ....
However, the exclusiveness of
the two lists does not mean that similar or even identical laws may
not be enacted by both levels of government. Some laws are available
to both levels, but that is because such laws have a double aspect,...
not because the classes of subjects duplicate or overlap each other;
they do not.
P. HoGG, supra note 24, at 332-33.
292. See Appendix.
293. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
294. 24 S.C.R. 170 (1894).
295. Id
296. Attorney Gen. for Ont. v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1896 App.Cas. 348,
371 (P.C.) (Can.).
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tion from that reference until 1948 was appealed to the Privy
Council.2 7 None of those cases gave any hope of special Privy
Council support for provincial autonomy. The Privy Council
also affirmed in every appeal of an intra vires ruling,298 how-

ever, so apparently it had no tendency to favor either the provinces or the Dominion.
The tendency to seek provincial references followed by an
appeal to the Supreme Court developed earlier with respect to
questions concerning provincial law than it did regarding questions of Dominion law.m A 1940 reference upholding the validity of British Columbia petroleum and coal regulations
affirmed a reference opinion of the British Columbia high
court. 300 A second appeal of a provincial reference was submitted to the Supreme Court in 1948,301 and from that date forward all but two Supreme Court references on provincial
legislation have come by appeal from provincial reference opinions. 302 The Court found the provincial legislation ultra vires
297. Reference re B.C. Fisheries, 47 S.C.R. 493, 510 (1912), qff'd Attorney
Gen. B.C. v. Attorney Gen. Can., 1914 App.Cas. 153, 195 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re Alta. Legislation, 48 S.C.R. 919 (1912), aff'd, Attorney Gen. Alta. v. Attorney Gen.-Can., 1915 App.Cas. 363, 371 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re
Employment of Aliens, 63 S.C.R. 293, 304 (1921), qff'd Brooks-Bidlake & Whittal v. Attorney Gen. for B.C., 1923 App.Cas. 450 (P.C.); Reference re Man. Act,
1924 S.C.R. 317, 329, aff'd Attorney Gen. for Man. v. Attorney Gen. for Can.,
1925 App.Cas. 561, 567 (1925); Reference re Alta. Statutes, 1937, 1938 S.C.R.
100, aff'd Attorney Gen. for Alta. v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1939 App.Cas.
117, 135 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re Debt Adjustment Act, Alta., 1937, 1942
S.C.R. 31, 41, aff'd Attorney Gen. for Alta v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1943
App.Cas. 356, 376 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re The Farm Sec. Act, 1944, 1947
S.C.R. 394, 420, aff'd, Attorney Gen. for Sask. v. Attorney Gen. for Can., 1949
App.Cas. 110, 127 (P.C.) (Can.).
298. Reference re Que. Educ. Sys., 1926 S.C.R. 246, aff'd, Hirsh v. Protestant School Comm'rs, 1928 App.Cas. 200, 211 (P.C.) (Can.); Reference re § 17
Alta. Act, 1927 S.C.R. 364, aff'd 1958 App.Cas. 548; Reference re Hours of
Work Act, 1948 S.C.R. 373, 402, aff'd, Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Attorney Gen., 1950
App.Cas. 122,148 (P.C.) (Can.).
299. As indicated supra text accompanying notes 233-36, most Supreme
Court references on Dominion legislation have come on appeal from provincial
high courts since 1958. The reliance on appeals in the case of provincial legislation thus started as early as 1940. Certainly since 1948 it has been the predominant approach.
300. Home Oil Distributors Ltd v. Attorney-Gen for B.C., 54 B.C.R. 48
(1939), aff'd 1940 S.C.R. 444. Reference re The Thrasher Case, B.C. 153 (1882)
was by all appearances an appeal, although no statutory basis existed for such
appeal and the Supreme Court opinion is not reported except as a note to the
British Columbia court's opinion. See supra note 233 and accompanying text
(discussing Thrasher).
301. Reference re The Minimum Wage Act, 1948 S.C.R. 248.
302. The two exceptions are Reference re Farm Prods. Mktg. Act, 1950,
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in five of these references 30 3 and intra vires in six.3 G4 The

Court affirmed the provincial court opinion in nine of these appeals. In the two reversals the provincial court found the provincial legislation intra vires. 305 One might argue that these
two reversals indicate a Dominion bias, but the evidence more
likely demonstrates the Supreme Court's deferential attitude
toward provincial courts.
C. PRovINCIAL VERSUS DOMINION CONTROL OF LAND AND
RESOURCES

Fifteen references have addressed provincial versus Dominion control over land and natural resources. Most of these
references have involved control over waters, submerged lands,
and the minerals in those submerged lands. The Supreme
Court has recognized a divided control over these resources
consistent with the language of Sections 91 and 92 and relevant
common law property doctrines. The Court has held that title
to submerged lands depends on the nature of the waterway the Dominion has title to the beds of tidal and navigable waterways and the province or riparian landowner has title to beds
of nonnavigable waterways. 306 The Court has held that the
owner of the bed owns the fishery, except in tidal and navigable waters where fish are considered ferae naturae.30 7 The
power to regulate the fishery is divided between the Dominion
1957 S.C.R. 198, and Reference re Language Rights Under the Man. Act, [1985]

1 S.C.R. 721.
303. Reference re Farm Security Act, 1944, 1947 S.C.R. 394, qffd, 1948
App.Cas. 110; Reference re Esquinalt & Nanaimo Ry. Co., 1948 S.C.R. 403; Reference re Orderly Payment of Debts Act, Alta., 1959, 1960 S.C.R. 571; Reference re the Family Relations Act, S.B.C. 1978, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 62; Reference re
Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297.
304. Home Oil Distributors Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. for B.C., 1940 S.C.R. 444;
Reference re Hours of Work Act, 1948 S.C.R. 373, affd, 1950 App.Cas. 122;
Reference re The Vehicles Act, Sask, 1957, 1958 S.C.R. 608; Reference re The
Jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court Act, 1965 S.C.R. 772; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, Alta., 1980, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Reference
re An Act to Amend the Education Act, Ont., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
305. Reference re Esquinalt & Nanaimo Ry. Land Grant, 1948 S.C.R. 403;
Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297.
306. Reference re Fisheries, 26 S.C.R. 444, 444-46 (1895) (holding that all
water beds are subject to Dominion jurisdiction and control), qffd, 1895

App.Cas. 700; Reference re Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia,
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 388; Reference re Seabed & Subsoil of the Continental Shelf
Offshore Nfld., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
307. Reference re B.C. Fisheries, 47 S.C.R. 493, 510 (1912), qff'd, 1914
App.Cas. 153.
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and the provinces.3 08 Ownership of minerals in submerged
lands was found to depend on title in the case of territorial waters,3 0 9 and on international law in the case of nonterritorial
310
waters.
References have addressed other natural resource questions, including ownership of precious metals, 3 " public rights in
navigable waters, 3 12 control over water power,3 13 control of
public lands, 3 14 natural products marketing,3 15 natural gas taxation,3 16 control of private water rights,3 17 regulation of navigation,3 1 8 and provincial authority relative to school and railway
lands.3 19 Taken together, these references on the subject of
natural resources have favored neither the provinces nor the
Dominion. In the fifteen references, the Dominion prevailed
six times320 and the provinces five times.3 2 ' Four opinions gave
308. Reference re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1928 S.C.RL 457, aff'd, 1930 App.Cas.
111.
309. Reference re Offshore Mineral Rights, 1967 S.C.R. 792, 817 (1967);
Reference re the Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia, [1984] 1 S.C.R.
388.
310. Reference re the Seabed & Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore
Nfld., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
311. Reference re Precious Metals, 1927 S.C.R. 458 (affirming, in a dispute
between the Dominion and a private company, that the Crown owns precious
metals, even under private lands), aff'd, 1929 App.Cas. 285. In terms of the
relative rights of the provinces and the Dominion, Crown rights depend on
ownership of the surface, absent a contrary reservation. See P. HOGG, supra
note 24, at 569-70.
312. Reference re Waters and Water-Power, 1929 S.C.R. 200, 201-03.
313. 1d&
314. Reference re Sask. Natural Resources, 1931 S.C.R. 263, 266 (resolving
a dispute between the Dominion and Saskatchewan over lands contained in
the N.W. Territory and Rupert's Land before the creation of the province).
315. Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934, 1936 S.C.R. 398, 426,
aff'd, 1937 App.Cas. 377.
316. Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1004,

1005.
317. Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1
S.C.R. 297, 335 (defining the limits of province power relative to the rights of
a private party in another province).
318. Reference re Fisheries, 26 S.C.R. 444, 444-46 (1895), aff'd, 1985
App.Cas. 700.
319. Reference re Common School Funds and Lands, 28 S.C.R. 609, 609
(1898); Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 31 S.C.R. 516, 531
(1901), rev'd, 1903 App.Cas. 39; Reference re § 189 of the Railway Act, 1926
S.C.R. 163, 177-78, af0d 1926 App.Cas. 715.
320. Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 28 S.C.R. 609, 609
(1897); Reference re B.C. Fisheries, 47 S.C.R. 493, 510 (1912), aff'd, 1914
App.Cas. 153; Reference re Waters and Water-Power, 1929 S.C.R. 200; Reference re Sask. Natural Resources, 1931 S.C.R. 263, 266; Reference re Offshore
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no clear advantage to either side.32 2 Except on the subject of

offshore minerals, reference opinions have not played a dominant part in resolving the allocation of natural resources. The
two offshore mineral references, Reference re Offshore Mineral
Rights,

23

and Reference re Seabed and Subsoil of the Continen-

tal Shelf Offshore Newfoundand,SM are the leading opinions on
the subject,3 2s and they reflect a division of control over natural
resources consistent with historic common law and interna326
tional law principles.
This review of the Supreme Court's reference opinions addressing the allocation of power in the Canadian federation suggests that the reference has not been a tool for expansion of
Dominion power at the expense of the provinces. Although
before the abolition of Privy Council appeals many of the same
issues were appealed to that body either directly from provincial references or from Supreme Court references, 327 nothing
suggests the prospect of appeal to higher authority restrained
the Supreme Court.328 In subject areas other than federalism,
Supreme Court bias was never a reason to question the reference process. In those areas, the sole concern was that the reference process would yield poorly informed and inadequately
considered opinions. The next section examines the reference
cases in light of these concerns.
Mineral Rights, 1967 S.C.R. 792, 817; Reference re the Seabed & Subsoil of the
Continental Shelf Offshore Nfld, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86, 128.
321. Reference re Common School Fund and Lands, 31 S.C.R. 516, 531
(1901), rev'd, 1903 App.Cas. 39; Reference re Fisheries Act, 1914, 1928 S.C.R.
457, affd, 1930 App.Cas. 111; Reference re Natural Prods. Mktg. Act, 1934,
1936 S.C.R. 398; Reference re Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax, [1982] 1 S.C.R.
1004; Reference re the Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia, [1984] 1
S.C.R. 388.
322. Reference re Fisheries, 26 S.C.R. 444 (1895) (province prevailed on issues relating to control of fisheries and submerged lands while the Dominion
prevailed on the issue of authority to regulate navigation, affd 1895 App.Cas.
700); Reference re § 189 of the Railway Act, 1926 S.C.R. 163 (dispute about
railway authority to take provincial lands pursuant to Dominion legislation,
q d, 1926 App.Cas. 715); Reference re Precious Metals, 1927 S.C.R. 458 (dispute between the Dominion and a private claimant); Reference re Upper
Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.&. 297 (concerning provincial control over vested private water rights).
323. 1967 S.C.R. 792.
324. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86.
325. See P. HOGG, supra note 24, at 586-88.
326. Id.
327. Privy Council appeals were abolished in 1949. See supra note 69;
Appendix.
328. As is indicated supra text accompanying notes 245-52, the Privy Council rarely overruled the Supreme Court.
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V. EVALUATING THE CONCERNS ABOUT ADVISORY
OPINIONS
The Supreme Court of Canada's resolution of important
constitutional issues in an advisory proceeding is not the danger
some early Canadian jurists perceived it to be. The process has
been widely accepted, and the reference opinions have withstood the test of time as well as any of the thousands of decisions Canadian courts have rendered. The following sections
examine the impact of the reference proceeding in light of
early arguments against its use.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ARE UNWARRANTED

1. Separation of Powers
Constitutional objections to the Canadian Supreme Court's
reference jurisdiction were rooted in federalism, separation of
powers, and due process. 329 Of these, the least persuasive from
the outset of the Canadian federation was the separation of
powers concern. Although the concept of a Supreme Court was
a break with English tradition, and thus invited analogy to the
American experience,3 0 the Canadian national government
was not one of separated powers in the sense understood by
Americans. The model was Westminster, not Washington,
meaning the judiciary could advise the executive and parliament without sacrificing its independence.
Although the theory of separation of powers presented no
serious obstacle,3 3 ' the Canadian Supreme Court did encounter
problems of institutional competence in implementing its advisory function. Courts are designed to resolve disputes between
adversaries. Their processes are fashioned with this task in
mind. When asked to function as legal advisors, a role most
judges have performed earlier in their careers, courts can try to
adapt their institutional processes to those of the solicitor, or
they can adapt references to the processes of adjudication. The
Canadian Supreme Court has tended to the latter approach, as
references have come to look more and more like ordinary
cases. 332
329. See supra notes 73-108 and accompanying text.
330. Justice Idington urged the American analogy in Reference re References, 43 S.C.R. 536, 579-82 (1910), aff'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912).
331. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
332. As Strayer points out, the Court has been encouraged in this "judicializing" of the reference by "both Parliament and the Legislatures [which have]
intended that the procedure in reference cases should be as similar as possible
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As early as 1889, the Court addressed the question of standing in a reference proceeding.3 Rather than conclude that the
Court's attorney-client relationship is only with the government, a logical and legitimate basis for refusing advice to third
parties, the Court spoke the language of adjudication in arguing
that a private party has no standing to initiate a reference.33The reference proceeding has taken on other characteristics of
adjudication. The Court has addressed questions of evidence in
several reference proceedings. For example, in Reference re
Wartime Leasehold Regulations,m Chief Justice Rinfret concluded that the Court should review only material appearing in
the order of reference, unless the material is of common knowledge. 33 6 Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion
Act 33 7 liberalized this evidentiary standard, but the continuing

concern about the admissibility of evidence testifies to the
Court's effort to adapt the advisory function to the processes of
adjudication. These efforts began in 1891 with amendments
that provided for notice to parties concerned about the specific
question submitted.
This change was reflected in the 1905
Reference re Abstention from Sunday Labour,33 9 in which
counsel represented both a railway company and a copper
company.
to the procedure employed in ordinary litigation." B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at
278. Strayer goes on to conclude that "[t]he approach taken by both bench and
bar in references is scarcely distinguishable from an ordinary appeal." Id
333. In Reference re The Jesuits' Estates Act, 12 Legal News 283 (1889),
the Court declined to consider a reference brought on a private party's initiative. Id at 288. The Court expressed concerns similar to those that justify
modern limits on taxpayer and citizen standing. See B. STRAYER, supra note 6,
at 158-69. Notably, Canadian standing law, particularly on questions of constitutionality, is considerably more liberal than is current American law. In
Strayer's words: '"The requirements of standing appear to be largely irrelevant where a constitutional issue is referred to the courts." Id. at 156.
334. The Court stated:
In his position as "a citizen of the Dominion of Canada and a taxpayer
of the Province of Quebec" his rights, in respect to all such questions
as may arise under the two statutes which his petition refers to, are
mainly, if not altogether, under the care of the Legislature and Government which have been chosen to administer public affairs in that
province under the provisions of the British North America Act.
12 Legal News at 284.
335. 1950 S.C.R. 124.
336. Id. at 127.
337. [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297.
338. An Act Respecting the Supreme and Exchequer Courts, ch. 25, § 4, 189
CAN. STAT. 147.
339. 35 S.C.R. 581 (1905).
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2. Due Process
The Court's concern for traditional judicial processes in
performing its advisory function reflects its concern for the due
process implications of reference procedure. If reference opinions are purely advisory, due process concerns are misplaced
because no party is bound and thus no rights are violated. Individuals unrepresented in a reference proceeding will have their
day in court when the law actually is implemented and affects
their interests. In no other situation is the legal advisor expected to consult with parties other than the client who have
an interest in the client's actions. This is true even when the
client, like the government, acts on behalf of others. If an
agent fails to represent the interests of his principal, one of the
principal's alternatives is to get a new agent. By analogy, the
political process, not the courts, is the proper forum for dissatisfied citizens.
The due process concern persists nonetheless and for good
reason. Reference opinions are more than advice to clients.
Despite the Supreme Court's recurrent protestations, 340 its reference opinions are not purely advisory. Lower courts treat
them as binding precedent.3 Public officials and citizens alike
probably do not distinguish them from any other decisions Canadian courts render. For several decades, the Supreme
Court's reference opinions were appealable to the Privy Council and provincial references remain appealable to the Supreme
Court. True advice cannot be appealed nor overruled. Reference opinions are routinely appealed and sometimes overruled
because they are judicial statements of the law, not non-binding
advice as the Court has consistently insisted. Because of this
reality, due process concerns are real and the Court's efforts to
ensure that private interests are not injured are appropriate
and necessary.?
3. Federalism
The most persistent constitutional challenge to reference
jurisdiction has been rooted in federalism. As recently as the
340. See supra notes 190-202.

341. Id.
342. Strayer argues that concern about affected private rights "appears specious for the same may be said of almost any decision." B. STRAYER, supra
note 6, at 292. The point made by comparison is valid, but it does not lead to
the conclusion that due process concerns are not present in reference
proceedings.
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constitutional amendment references of 1981 and 1982,33 the

provinces have claimed that the Supreme Court compromises
their sovereignty by rendering advisory opinions on matters of
provincial law and provincial power.344 Depending on the extent to which the Canadian federal system is designed to maintain a wall of separation between provincial and Dominion
governments, including the courts, the provinces may have had
a good argument. From the Supreme Court's point of view,
however, the federalism question, like the separation of powers
question, simply is a matter of constitutional interpretation.
The Court proceeds as a court having jurisdiction to interpret
the law of the Constitution, not as a branch of the Dominion
government. From this perspective, deciding federalism questions in a reference poses no greater threat to provincial sovereignty than resolving them in ordinary litigation.
The Constitution of Canada, as a matter of positive constitutional law, could provide expressly for judicial rendering of
advisory opinions. What can be done expressly can surely be
done by implication. Thus, the question whether Supreme
Court reference jurisdiction infringes on Canadian federalism
has been treated correctly as a straightforward problem of constitutional interpretation. When room exists for disagreement
about the Constitution's meaning, room exists for judicial discretion on the basis of policy considerations. Thus the important question, assuming agreement on constitutional objectives
of a federal system, is whether the reference process has affected the achievement of those objectives.
In the United States, for two centuries states have suffered
a steady decline in power. 3 5 One versed in American federalism therefore would expect that provinces have suffered as a
consequence of Supreme Court reference jurisdiction. The actual results in reference proceedings, however, seem to belie
that expectation.m Although the provinces have lost more
often than they have won in contests with the Dominion gov343. Reference re Questions Concerning the Amendment of the Constitution of Can., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 755; Reference re Constitution of Can., [1982] 2

S.C.R. 793.
344. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
345. See The Third Death of Federalism,3 CON. CoMM. 293 (1986).
346. In addressing the somewhat different concern that the abstract nature
of references favors findings of invalidity, Strayer reports that in 42 references
involving provincial legislative competence, the provincial legislation was upheld 22 times and found lacking 20 times. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 284.
These figures reflect Privy Council and Supreme Court references and
appeals.
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ernment over legislative power, their victories have been important. The Supreme Court has not proven to be a tool of the
Dominion government, and had it been inclined to adopt that
role, the least significant source of power would have been the
reference jurisdiction that the Court always has insisted binds
no one.
Indeed the reference process may have strengthened the
provinces within the Canadian federation by providing a highly
visible forum for pressing provincial sovereignty claims. To the
extent provincial power depends on politics, the provinces
stand to benefit from a legal process primarily engaged in the
ongoing definition of the distribution of power between the
provinces and the Dominion. The provinces also would seem to
benefit from having federalism issues addressed in the abstract
manner of a reference, a process requiring the Court to "attempt to determine and give effect to the broad purpose of the
Constitution."' 7 The repeated asking and answering of questions about the theory of Canadian federalism may have created a theoretical rigidity that translates into legal and political
reality. In contrast, the case law approach is confined to specific factual controversies, litigants, and remedies; it may not
provide a sufficient frame of reference to prevent erosion of a
federation's jurisdictional spheres.m Case-by-case analysis allows a court to blur the jurisdictional boundaries that abstract
theory clarifies. Ironically, the reference process the provinces
fought may have provided important protection for provincial
sovereignty. At the same time, the Dominion has not suffered,
as some had feared,3 9 at the hands of Supreme Court reference
jurisdiction. A workable and politically acceptable balance
seems to have been achieved.

B. POLICY ARGUMENTS

AGAINST ADVISORY OPINIONS ARE

INACCURATE OR INCONCLUSIVE

1. Speculative Nature
The Canadian experience suggests two different conclusions about the speculative and hypothetical nature of the reference process. To the extent referred questions are narrowly
347. Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 714, 723.
348. Justice Idington commented that reference jurisdiction may be implied as a means to "protect and so far as possible delimit [the provinces' and
Dominions'] respective spheres of jurisdiction." Reference re References, 43
S.C.R. at 568 (1910) (Idington, J., dissenting), cff'd, App.Cas. 571 (1912).
349. See supra note 257.
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drawn on specific questions of law affecting private interests,
the Supreme Court has recognized that speculation is problematic.as ° It also has recognized that truly interested parties may
be excluded from such abstract proceedings, leading to briefing
and argument by parties not fully aware of the interests they
purport to represent.-35 The solution to both problems has
been to modify the reference proceeding so that it is less speculative and more concrete. Modifications have included evidentiary adaptations and procedures to ensure representation of
2
interested parties.3
To the extent that reference questions are broadly framed,
some commentators believe that inadequate factual basis "hinder[s] sound characterization of laws."' 3 Hogg concludes that
"[e]ven when the questions are specific and the factual setting
is adequately presented, the lack of a concrete controversy can
'
lead the Court to miss the point of an important question."s
Strayer discusses several cases that he says "illustrateo their
potential for creating abstract jurisprudence," but concludes
that "[t]here are... several mitigating factors which should be
recognized in assessing the merits of the reference system in
this respect."3 5 5 Among these factors is the reality that conceptual rather than functional decisions are inherent to constitutional interpretation whether in a reference or in ordinary
litigation.
2.

Collusive Nature

The danger of collusion has not been important in
Supreme Court thinking about the reference proceeding. To
the extent that collusion may lead to poorly addressed questions and unrepresented points of view, the procedural adjust350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra text accompanying notes 114-27.
See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
E.g., The Supreme Court Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. S-26, § 53(5) (1986).
B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 283.
354. P. HOGG, supra note 24, at 181. Hogg cites Reference re Agricultural
Prods. Mktg. Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, as an example of an opinion that fails to
resolve "one of the main points in dispute." I& at 181.
355. B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 288. "First it should be recognized that
while such decisions were conceptual rather than functional, this was also true
of contemporary decisions in normal litigation." I&L at 288-89. "Secondly,

there are situations where there is no need for a factual study of legislative
effect or administrative action." Id at 289. "Thirdly the remedy for abstract
reference decisions should not be total abandonment of this sometimes useful

device, but rather a more selective use of it accompanied by adequate fact-introduction." Id. at 290.
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ments just mentioned are helpful. Collusion does not appear to
have been viewed as a problem, however, at least with respect
to the issues generally addressed in reference proceedings. In
fact, most references appear to result from collusion in the
sense that opposing parties agree to submit an issue to the
Court. Such "collusion" is necessary to any provincial challenge to Dominion action in the Supreme Court, because only
the Dominion can compel the Governor General to refer a
question to the Court.356 When abstract questions of constitutional design are in issue, collusion is not a danger.
3. Erosion of Authority
The Canadian experience over a century and a quarter evidences that rendering non-binding, advisory opinions has not
eroded the Supreme Court's authority. Although the Supreme
Court's influence has been questioned by some,35 7 there is no
basis for concluding that the court's authority has been eroded
by issuance of non-binding opinions. Lower courts often treat
the Supreme Court's reference opinions as binding precedent.3 8 If the Dominion or a provincial government rejected
the Supreme Court's advice, or if a lower court or the Supreme
Court itself actually ignored a reference opinion, the Court's
authority might erode. As practiced in Canada, however, the
reference proceeding has not put this concern for judicial authority to a test.
4. Addressing Constitutional Questions
The Canadian experience neither proves nor disproves the
claim that an advisory opinion process will encourage courts to
address constitutional questions. Most reference cases have involved constitutional issues, but those issues also have been
raised with regularity through ordinary judicial proceedings. It
is impossible to know whether the Court would have addressed
fewer constitutional questions without the reference process.
The more important issue, however, is whether the objective of avoiding constitutional questions is desirable, particularly when courts can address those questions in the sometimes
contemplative setting of a reference. Nothing suggests the con356. See supra text accompanying notes 222-32.
357. "Canadian political scientists do not consider the Supreme Court to
have been a major factor in shaping federal-provincial relations since 1949."
Russell, supra note 25, at 590.
358. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
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stitutional questions the Supreme Court has addressed in references have been less well answered than those it has addressed
in ordinary cases. Nor is there reason to conclude that Canadian constitutional law would be better off if the Court had left
these constitutional questions unanswered. To the contrary,
the nature and intensity of constitutional conflict in Canada
over the last two decades required the resolution of constitutional questions. Ordinary adjudication might have resolved
those questions satisfactorily, but the reference system expedited the answers.3 9
5. Political Questions and Mootness
Canada's reference history demonstrates that concerns
about political questions and mootness are misplaced. As the
United States Supreme Court's experience with the political
question doctrine evidences, the boundary between constitutional questions and political questions is blurred at best.360
Constitutional questions are by nature political, particularly
those relating to the allocation of legislative power in a federal
system. Such political questions often are addressed best in the
abstract setting of an advisory proceeding, where particular interests may be submerged.s61 The claim that the reference proceeding will permit or encourage the answering of moot
questions is illogical in light of the often tandem objection that
these proceedings are hypothetical and therefore too speculative. A hypothetical proceeding cannot become moot because
by definition it never was a dispute in the first place.
359. "A balanced assessment of the reference procedure must acknowledge
its utility as a means of securing an answer to a constitutional question ....
The reference procedure enables an early resolution of the constitutional
doubt." P. HOGG, supra note 24, at 181.
360. As early as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief
Justice Marshall suggested that some questions may be political and thus not
within judicial authority. A political question doctrine evolved through several cases, but recent caselaw greatly limits the doctrine's scope. The Court
has settled on a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" test to
determine when the political nature of questions limits judicial authority. See
L. TRIBE, SUPra note 101, at 96-107.
361. According to Strayer,
[t]he principal danger to be avoided... is the reference of essentially
a political issue to the courts: where there are few, if any, genuinely
legal criteria to which courts can resort for a rationale for their decision, they may be perceived as making a political judgment which
may impair their long-term credibility.
B. STRAYER, supra note 6, at 295.
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C. PoLIcY ARGUMENTS FAVORING ADVISORY OPINIONS ARE
PERSUASIVE

Reference opponents have carried the burden of challenging a status quo deeply rooted in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. Defenders of the reference have relied, however, on
more than tradition. More than a century of experience suggests that the arguments favoring an advisory role for Canadian
courts were well conceived.
The most obvious justification for judicial advice to the legislative and executive branches of government has been the
need for timely and authoritative opinions on the validity of
contemplated governmental action. References commonly
question the legality of proposed legislative or administrative
actions.3 6 2 One option is to take action, leaving the regular
course of judicial proceedings to resolve doubts about validity.
If the judiciary ultimately concludes the action is invalid, the
government returns to ground zero and must delay resolution
of some problem or implementation of some program. It is far
more efficient to simply ask the courts in advance about the validity of proposed actions.
Although the Attorney General or retained counsel can offer timely advice, courts also offer authoritativeness. Because
the legal advisor must prognosticate future judicial action,
courts are the best advisors, even if the reference opinion is
truly only advisory. On questions of constitutionality, there can
be no better legal advisor than the court ultimately responsible
for interpreting the Constitution.
Reliable advice offers numerous obvious benefits. Those
benefits are even greater when the advice is treated as binding
precedent, as it is in Canada. The legislature and executive can
act with assurance that a court will not subsequently invalidate
their actions. Time and resources invested in governmental actions are risked only on the adequacy and wisdom of the action,
not on the uncertainties of future legal proceedings. Subsequent challenges based on facts arguably different from those
contemplated in a reference are not precluded, but they are discouraged by abstract judicial opinions that often readily apply
to a host of fact situations. Furthermore, the total direct costs
of constitutional interpretation by reference are likely significantly less than the costs of interpretation by ordinary adjudication. Incentives to engage in legal proceedings may decrease
362. See supra note 262 and accompanying

text.
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as the questions posed become increasingly abstract. It is impossible to know how much ordinary constitutional litigation
Canada would have had without the reference system, but it
seems intuitive that without the system, the Canadian Supreme
Court's constitutional caseload would have been greater.
At the heart of debate about the reference system is not
the government's need for and right to legal advice, but its need
for and right to judicial advice. Judicial advice has a special
quality, perhaps because the best lawyers are presumed to be
judges, and surely because courts often will have the final say
in interpreting the law. The central issue is whether courts
should render legal opinions in the generally hypothetical circumstances of advisory proceedings. The Canadian experience
suggests that the benefits are considerable and the dangers far
fewer than American lawyers and judges generally assume.
VI.

REFERENCES AS A POSITIVE FORCE IN
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

Canadian lawyers may say that the conclusion that references have been a positive force in Canadian constitutional interpretation was obvious from the outset. Many of them
probably would view an American lawyer's fascination with the
issue as conclusive evidence of American provincialism. 36 3 Ca-

nadian lawyers may find this comprehensive survey of their
Supreme Court references a useful catalogue, if not particularly
insightful. Perhaps Canadian judges will be reminded of the
transparency of insisting that reference opinions are advisory
only. Some Canadian lawyers and judges even may gain a new
appreciation for the reference system as an integral part of
their constitutional system, rather than just another inheritance from British law.

The principal audience for this study, however, surely must
be American lawyers and judges. The American presumption
against advisory opinions is as ingrained as the Canadian presumption in favor of the reference system. The presumptive
363.

An early version of this Article was presented to the Biennial Confer-

ence of The Association for Canadian Studies in the United States in Montreal
on Oct. 8, 1987. The few Canadian lawyers in attendance seemed to find my
interest in the subject quaint, if not misdirected. More recently we encountered great puzzlement when we attempted to determine through the
Supreme Court Clerk's Office what references are pending. Although modern
references seem to be consistently identified by their case name as references,
the people in the clerk's office were not accustomed to distinguishing them
from other cases pending before the court.
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acceptance of what works is fortuity; the presumptive rejection
of what might work is ignorance. The reference system has
functioned well in Canada and the Canadian experience should
give reason for a second look at the settled American position.
History demonstrates that legal system imports and exports
often yield unexpected results.3 Law and legal institutions inescapably intertwine with culture,Ses but the shared common
law history and neighborly development as New World federations make the United States and Canada good candidates for
legal transplants without cultural rejection. The Canadian experience therefore offers several lessons that should interest
American jurists.
The assumption that advisory proceedings are qualitatively
distinct from adjudicative proceedings is incorrect. The distinction is one of degree. The traditional adjudicative proceeding
can not always avoid hypothesis. The advisory proceeding is
seldom entirely devoid of concreteness. More importantly, the
advisory proceeding can be modified to overcome many of the
shortcomings inherent in abstract proceedings. 3 6 Not surprisingly, appropriate procedures can ensure due process and accommodate the judicial institution to the rendering of advice.
A middle ground thus exists between abstract and concrete judicial proceedings.
The abstract proceeding, moreover, is sometimes appropriate for the questions courts must resolve, particularly when
those questions require constitutional interpretation. Constitutional provisions often differ from statutory provisions in their
degrees of abstractness. The statement of general concepts,
rather than specific conceptions, permits a constitution to function over extended periods of time. Just as drafting and adoption of such abstract statements of principle may require people
364. "Although history records many examples of import and export of
legal rules and institutions, it also evidences a rule or institution in its new setting is never what it was in its original setting. Except in those cases of complete political, social, and economic take-over which occurred during the era of
colonialism, imported legal systems have invariably been forced to adapt, often
in drastic ways, to their new cultural setting. Even in countries with a long
history of foreign domination, established colonial legal systems have been
forced to adjust to the realities of the new political, social and economic order
of independence." J. HUFFMAN, GOVERNMENT LiABrIY AND DISASTER MmITGATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 10 (1986).
365. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
14-20 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing different structures and "families" in the world
legal system).
366. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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to divorce themselves from their personal circumstances, so interpretation may depend on insulation from the appeals of
those with vested interests. Because protection of at least some
vested interests is a common principle in western constitutionalism, balancing the abstract and the concrete is easy. The hypothetical nature of the advisory proceeding, particularly as
modified in the Canadian reference system, seems to facilitate
rather than inhibit wise constitutional interpretation.
We cannot know whether the substance of American constitutional law would be different if Chief Justice Jay had answered the questions President Washington submitted, but to
the extent it would be, United States Supreme Court doctrine
might better reflect the underlying principles and values of
American constitutionalism. Some say facts are the missing ingredient in advisory proceedings, but facts can be known in
various ways and in any event may obscure questions of principle. Philosophy, not the nature of the proceeding, most often
367
has governed Canadian Supreme Court reference opinions.
It is better to ask and answer the fundamental, philosophical
questions of constitutional law in the daylight a reference provides than in the obscurity of the adjudicatory process.
The visibility and distinctness of these proceedings may
have played an important role in maintaining certain aspects of
Canadian constitutional government. The provincial governments persistently have used the reference forum to remind
the Dominion government and the population generally of
their claims to sovereignty and political power.3 68 In most of
the world's federal systems, the constituent states gradually
have relinquished power through the seemingly inevitable, centripetal forces of politics. 3 69 The Canadian provinces, however,
have maintained a consistently important role in government.3 70 To contend that the reference system is a total explanation of this situation would be naive. The Court, however,
has rendered decisions favorable to the provinces on many basic
367. Davison notes that the Privy Council opinion in Attorney Gen. for
Can. v. Attorney Gen. for Ont., 1937 App.Cas. 355 (P.C.) (Can.), "is, after all,
an expression of political philosophy rather than the exercise of a function
non-judicial in kind." Davison, supra note 286, at 267.
368. See supra notes 254-327 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., W. BERNETr, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 198 (1964).

370. "It is widely believed that American federalism is characterized by
weak states and Canadian federalism by strong provinces." Feldman, Federal
Systems are Not All Alike (But that May be Changing), in J. MAGNEL., CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 8, 9 (1985).
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federalism issues, in a forum the provinces once feared as a
threat to their sovereigntyY' 1 The reference system therefore
likely has contributed to provincial standing in the Canadian
federal system. The Canadian Supreme Court has recognized
repeatedly that the provinces have a determinable sovereignty
that, unlike most of the power of the American states, is not
subject to curtailment under one balancing test or another.37 2
The Supreme Court thus has been a regular defender of provincial sovereignty through the reference procedure.
Although separation of powers was never accepted as a basis for limiting the Canadian Supreme Court's reference jurisdiction, the United States nevertheless can derive important
lessons about separation of powers from the Canadian experience. The traditional argument, widely accepted in the United
States, has been that separation of powers prevents courts from
rendering advice to the legislative and executive branches of
government. 373 If the reference opinions actually were treated
as advice, rather than binding judicial holdings, the blending of
judicial with executive or legislative functions might overwhelm Americans. When the reference opinions are treated
like any other decision for precedential purposes, however, the
separation of powers concern is largely avoided. The federal
court would function as a court and the legislative and executive officials would view its opinions as those of a court. The
Canadian system demonstrates that a court can render a reasoned and workable decision in a hypothetical setting without
insisting on the strictly adversary context of traditional adjudicative proceedings.
This conclusion is likely to be tested in coming years as
more questions are referred to the Canadian Supreme Court on
the subject of individual rights. Because the theory of separa371. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
372. Although the Canadian law of federalism may have been the same if
resolved entirely through ordinary adjudication, it seems unlikely. The United
States law of federalism has evolved in a long series of lawsuits often brought
by private interests seeking to avoid federal government regulation. These litigants primarily are interested in avoiding regulation, not asserting the regulatory power of state governments. Because the issues are addressed piecemeal
and narrowly in ordinary adjudication, courts can slowly and almost imperceptibly chip away at the state power. By addressing the federalism issues in the
reference setting, even when that setting has been modified to resemble ordinary adjudication, the basic concept of divided powers is less likely to be submerged beneath the particular private or regulatory interests involved in a
case.
373. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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tion of powers involves a concern for the protection of individual liberty, concern about breaching that separation should be
greatest when questions about constitutional rights under the
Charter of Rights are referred to the Court. 374 Perhaps those
questions cannot be addressed in a hypothetical proceeding
without sacrificing individual rights to the pressures of growing
governmental power. The experience of individuals, however,
may be similar to the experience of the provinces. The reference procedure may prove an ideal forum in which to address
fundamental questions of individual liberty.
Finally, to the extent that judicial resolution of hypothetical questions actually functions as an advisory proceeding, the
Canadian experience indicates that discretion can protect those
values that such proceedings may threaten. The discretion of
comity has served provincial interests; the discretion of deference has protected the non-judicial functions of the Dominion
government; and the discretion of abstention has ensured due
process to individuals. 375 It might be argued that a society
should not rely on such discretion to protect these important
values, but in reality judges have enormous discretion. The abstract nature of the reference proceeding, in which the pressures of vested interests are minimi ed, may be the safest
context for courts to exercise such discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Canadian reference system has functioned well, evidencing few of the problems critics predicted. The reason is not
that concerns about advisory proceedings were misplaced entirely; to some extent those concerns were well founded.
Canadians have addressed those concerns, however, modifying
their reference system into a valuable institution for constitutional interpretation.
American lawyers and jurists should take notice of the relative success of the Canadian reference system. The system has
provided a workable and prompt means of addressing issues
that arise in federal systems of government. To the extent that
the Americans and Canadians share this type of system, per374. See supra note 221.
375. Hogg believes "that the Court has not made sufficient use of its discretion not to answer a question posed on a reference," but concludes that "[a]
balanced assessment of the reference must acknowledge its utility." P. HOGG,
supra note 24, at 180-81.
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haps the American system might benefit from the lessons the
Canadian reference system provides.
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